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ABSTRACT
POLICY  ANALYSIS  OF  WISCONSIN'S  DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE  MANDATORY  ARREST  LAW
POIICY  ANALYSIS
HOLLY  C. MCABEE
MAY  6, 1999
Content  Description:  This  exploratory  paper  is an attempt  to examine  the  factors  that  led
to  the  criminalization  of  domestic  violence.  Beginning  with  an overview  of  the  history  of
reform  movements  to end  family  violence,  the  report  then  reviews  the  factors  that
influenced  the  enactment  of  mandatory  arrest  policies  in  Wisconsin,  as well  as across  the
United  States.  The  last  sections  critically  examine  existing  research  on  the  deterrent
effects  of  arrest.  Research  suggests  that  arrest  may  have  some  deterrent  effects  on
different  offender  subgroups,  however,  may  be a relatively  weak  sanction  and  deterrent
effects  may  be short  term.  The  greatest  point  of  intervention  appears  to  be in  the
implementation  of  the  law.  Unintended  consequences  of  mandatory  arrest  policies  are
identified  and  altemative  approaches  are  discussed.  Existing  gaps  in  the  literature  are
identified  and  suggestions  for  future  research  are  provided.  Finally,  the  report  addresses
the  implications  of  domestic  violence  has  on social  work  practice.
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The  highest  probability  today  of  being  assaulted,  for  both  men  and  women,  occurs
in one's  own  home  (Straus,  1990).  One  in six  Americans  experience  one or  more  physical
assaults  by  a spouse  each  year  (Straus  &  Gelles,  1990).  Though  domestic  violence  can
and  does  transcend  all  economic,  social  and  religious  factors  of  society  (Felder  & Victor,
1996),  the  risk  of  being  assaulted  falls  predominantly  on women,  rather  than  their  male
counterparts.
In the  United  States  today,  a woman  is beaten  by  her  husband  or boyfriend  every
15 seconds  (FBI,  1991).  Each  year,  approximately  2 million  women  are severely
assaulted  by male  partners  (American  Medical  Association,  1';)92).  Even  more  alarming,
this  means  that  if  every  woman  victimized  by domestic  violence  in 1989  were  to join
hands,  the string  of  women  would  span  from  New  York  to Los  Angeles  and  back  again
(U. S. Senate  Judiciary  Committee,  1990).
Women  are more  likely  to be killed  by their  intimate  partners  than  by  total  strangers
(Crowell  &  Burgess,  1996).  Crime  data  from  the FBI  indicate  that  approximately  1500
women  are murdered  each  year  by husbands  or boyfriends  (1993).
Physical  injuries  resulting  from  domestic  assaults  alone  cause  approximately
100,000  days  of  hospitalization;  28,700  emergency  room  visits;  and 39,900  visits  to a
physician  (Meyer,  1992).  Domestic  violence  costs  the nation  $67  billion  dollars  aruiually.
The  cost  to victims  is currently  estimated  at $450  billion  a year  (Meyer,  Miller,  Cohen  &
Wiersema,  1996).
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The  statistics  that  are available  on  the frequency  and  severity  of  domestic  violence
are likely  to reflect  under-reporting,  as victims  are often  reluctant  to report  their  intimates
to the  police  (Dutton,  1988;  Williarns  &  Hawkins,  1989).  It  is estimated  that  less  than
half  of  all  incidents  of  violence  perpetrated  against  women  by  intimates  are reported  to
the  police  (Bachman,  1994).
In  one  period  alone,  from  1967  to 1973,  battering  men  killed  17,500  women  and
children  in  the  United  States  (Jones,  1994).  The  frequency  of  victims  sustaining  severe
injuries,  the  chroffic,  escalating  nature  of  domestic  violence  and  the  potential  for  lethality
raise  serious  questions  that  warrant  extensive  investigation.  As  the  criminal  justice  system
can  often  be the  primary  vehicle  through  which  victims  seek  relief  and  perhaps  some
semblance  of  order,  the  application,  development  and effectiveness  of  intervention
methods  lends  itself  to insights  regarding  this  socially  egregious  problem.
The  purpose  of  this  study  is two-fold.  This  study  will  assess and  analyze  the
underlying  factors  which  led  to the  development  of  Wisconsin's  Mandatory  Arrest  Law
for  Domestic  Violence  and examine  the current  trends  that  are occurring  and  how  they
impact  the  effectiveness  of  the law.
RESEARCH  0UESTIONS
What  were  the underlying  factors  and intentions  underlying  the development  of
mandatory  arrest  policies  for  domestic  violence?  Specifically,  what  led  to the
development  of  Wisconsin's  Mandatory  Arrest  Law?  What  are the current  trends  that  are
occurring  in  relation  to mandatory  arrest  and  how  do they  impact  the  effectiveness  of  the




DESCRIPTION  OF  THE  POLICY
In  part,  as an outgrowth  of  the  historical  pervasiveness  of  domestic  violence,  the
Wisconsin  Legislature  passed  1987  Wisconsin  Act  346  on  April  21, 1988,  effective  the 1"'
day  of  April,  1989.  A  copy  of  Wisconsin  Act  346  appears  in  Appendix  A.  This  law,
which  became  known  as Wisconsin's  Mandatory  Arrest  Law  for  Domestic  Violence,
provides  numerous  definitions,  as well  as various  key  provisions  which  will  be outlined
in  this  section.
Wisconsin  Act  346,  now  Chapter  968  of  the Wisconsin  Statutes,  separated  the
crime  of  domestic  violence  from  that  of  violence  perpetrated  by strangers.  As  defined  in
Chapter  968,  "domestic  abuse"  is defined  to mean  any  of  the following  engaged  in  by  an
adult  person  against  his  or  her  spouse,  former  spouse,  adult  relative,  an adult  with  whom
the  person  resides  or formerly  resided  or against  an adult  with  whom  the  person  has a
child  in common:  intentional  infliction  of  physical  pain,  physical  injury  or illness,
intentional  impairment  of  physical  condition,  sexual  assault  or  a physical  act  that  may
cause  the other  person  to reasonably  fear  imminent  engagement  in  conduct  described
previously  [s. 968.075  (l)(a),  Stats.].
Under  the domestic  abuse  arrest  law,  a law  enforcement  officer  must  arrest  and
take  a person  into  custody  if  the officer  has reasonable  grounds  to believe  that  the  person
is committing  or has committed  domestic  abuse  and  that  the  person's  actions  constitute
the commission  of  a crime.  In  addition,  the officer  has to have  a reasonable  basis  for
believing  that  continued  domestic  abuse  against  the  alleged  victim  is likely  and/or  there  is
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evidence  of  physical  injury  to the  victim  [s. 968.075(2)(a),  Stats.].  If  the law enforcement
officer's  reasonable  grounds  for  belief  that  domestic  abuse  has been  committed  is based
on a report  of  an alleged  domestic  abuse  incident,  the  officer  is required  to make an arrest
only  if  the  report  is received  within  28 days  after  the incident  is alleged  to have  occurred.
Under  the domestic  abuse  law,  each  law  enforcement  agency  is required  to
develop,  adopt  and  implement  written  policies  regarding  arrest  procedures  for  domestic
abuse  incidents.  These  policies  must  include,  but  may  not  be limited  to statements  that
emphasize  that  an officer  "should  arrest"  and take  a person  into  custody  if  the offrcer  has
reasonable  grounds  to believe  that  the  person  is cotnmitting  or has committed  domestic
abuse  and  that  the  person's  actions  constitute  the  commission  of  a crime.  When  the
officer  has reasonable  grounds  to believe  that  domestic  abuse  has been  committed,  the
officer  does  not  have  to arrest  both  persons,  but  should  arrest  the  person  whom  the officer
believes  to be the "primary  physical  aggressor."  In  determining  the  primary  physical
aggressor,  the officer  is to consider  the intent  of  the section  to protect  victims,  the  relative
degree  of  injury  or fear  inflicted  on  the  persons  involved  and  any  history  of  domestic
abuse  between  the  persons,  if  that  history  can  reasonably  be ascertained  by  the  officer.
Finally,  policies  must  include  a statement  that  a law  enforcement  officer's  decision  as to
whether  or  not  to arrest  may  not  be based  on either  the consent  of  the victim  to any
subsequent  prosecution,  the  relationship  of  the  persons  involved  in  the incident  or solely
upon  the  absence  of  visible  indications  of  injury  or impairment  [s. 968.075(3)(a)1.,
Stats.].  Under  the domestic  abuse  law,  a law  enforcement  officer  is immune  from  civil
and  criminal  liability  arising  out  of  a decision  to arrest  or not  arrest  an alleged  domestic
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abuse  offender  if  the  officer's  decision  is made  in a good  faith  effort  to comply  with  the
law  [s. 968.075(6m),  Stats.].
Law  enforcement  agency  policies  must  also  include  a procedure  for  written
reports  where  no arrest  is made.  The  reports  must  include  a written  statement  as to why
an arrest  was  not  made.  The  reports  must  be sent  to the district  attorney's  office  in  the
county  where  the  acts occurred,  immediately  after  the investigation  of  the incident  has
been  completed,  for  review  to determine  whether  the  person  involved  in  the  incident
should  be charged  with  the commission  of  a crime  [s. 968.075(4),  Stats.].
The  mandatory  arrest  law  also  provides  a "no  contact"  provision  which  prohibits
contact  between  the arrested  offender  and  the  victim  for  72 hours  following  the arrest,
unless  the  victim  signs  a written  waiver.  Under  the "no-contact"  provision,  the  arrested
person  is required  to avoid  the  residence  of  the  alleged  victim  and,  if  applicable,  any
premises  temporarily  occupied  by  the  alleged  victim.  The  arrested  person  must  also  avoid
contacting  or causing  any  other  person  to contact  the alleged  victim,  other  than  law
enforcement  officers  and  attorneys  for  the arrest  person  and  alleged  victim
[s.968.075(5)(a)  l.,  Stats.].  If  a law  enforcement  officer  has reason  to believe  that  a
person  has violated  the  "no  contact"  requirements,  the  officer  is required  to arrest  and
take  that  person  into  custody  [s. 968.075  (5)(a)  2., Stats.].
The  arrested  person  must  be informed  orally  and in  writing  of  the "no  contact"
provision  requirements,  the consequences  of  violating  the  requirements  and  the
possibility  of  an increased  penalty  for  domestic  abuse  crimes  committed  during  the  72
hours  after  the arrest  unless  there  is a signed  waiver.  An  acknowledgment  stating  that  he
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or  she has  received  notice  of  the  requirements,  consequences  and  the  increased  penalty
provisions  of  the  no-contact  provision  must  be signed  by  the  arrested  person.  Notice  must
also  be given  orally  and  in  writing  to  the  arrested  person  if  the  victim  signs  a waiver  [s.
968.075(5)(b)  2., Stats.].  In  addition,  notice  of  the  no  contact  requirements  and  the
possibility  of,  procedure  for  and  effect  of  a waiver  of  these  requirements  must  also  be
provided  to the  victim  [s. 968.075(5)(d).,  Stats.].
The  arrested  person's  release  from  custody  following  a domestic  abuse  arrest  is
conditional  upon  his/her  signed  agreement  to refrain  from  any  threats  or  acts  of  domestic
abuse  against  the  alleged  victim  or  other  person  [s. 968.075  (6),  Stats.].  The  domestic
abuse  law  provides  an increased  penalty  enhancer  for  any  domestic  abuse  acts  which  are
cornrnitted  during  the  72 hours  immediately  following  an arrest  for  a domestic  abuse
incident,  regardless  of  whether  or  not  there  has been  a waiver  signed  by  the  victim.  The
maximum  terms  of  imprisonment  for  that  crime  may  be increased  by  not  more  than  two
years.  Also,  if  the  domestic  abuse  offense  is a misdemeanor,  the  increased  penalty
changes  the  status  of  the  offense  from  a misdemeanor  to a felony  [s. 939.621,  Stats.].  The
victim  of  the  subsequent  domestic  abuse  crime  does  not  have  to be the  same  individual
of  the  domestic  abuse  incident  that  resulted  in  the  arrest.
The  law  also  requires  district  attorney's  offices  to develop,  adopt  and  implement
written  policies  encouraging  the  prosecution  of  domestic  abuse  offenses.  The  policies
must  include,  but  not  be limited  to  the  following:  A  policy  indicating  that  a prosecutor's
choice  not  to  prosecute  a domestic  abuse  incident  should  not  be based  on  the  absence  of
visible  indications  of  injury  or  impairment,  upon  the  victim's  consent  to any  subsequent
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prosecution  of  the  other  person  or  upon  the  relationship  of  the  persons  involved  in  the
incident  [s. 968.075(7)(a),  Stats.].  Further,  when  any  domestic  abuse  incident  is reported
to the  district  attorney's  office,  including  a report  firom  a law  enforcement  agency  where
no arrest  was  made,  a charging  decision  by  the district  attorney  should,  absent
extraordinary  circumstances,  be made  not  later  than  two  weeks  after  the district  attomey
has received  notice  of  the incident  [s. 968.075(7)(b),  Stats.].  District  attomey's  offices  are
also  required  to submit  an annual  report  to the Wisconsin  Department  of  Justice  which
includes  the  number  of  arrests  for  domestic  abuse  incidents  in  their  county  and  the
nutnber  of  subsequent  prosecutions  and  convictions  of  the  persons  arrested  for  domestic
abuse  incidents  [s. 968.075  (9),  Stats.].
HISTORY  OF  THE  PROBLEM
Violence,  particularly  against  women,  is not  a new  phenomenon.  It seems
throughout  the eons  of  time,  violence  against  women  has existed.  Even  dating  back  to
primitive  times, stronger  males  naturally  dominated  weaker  females.  Man  literally  took
his  wife  and  niled  her  by  physical  force  (Jones,  1994).
The first  known  laws  of  marriage  were  formalized  by  Romulus,  the  founder  of
Rome, around 753 B.C.E. These  laws  required  women  to conform  to their  husbands
entirely  (Browne,  1987).  In  addition,  the  Romans  had  the  most  extensive  legal
definition(s)  of  a husband's  traditional  rights  over  his  wife.  For  example,  the  husband  was
the guardian  of  his  wife;  as such  the  rights  included  the sole  power  to sell  his  wife  and
children  into  slavery  or even  put  them  to death  (Pomeroy,  1975).
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The  Romans  were  not  unique  in  their  beliefs,  as permissible  violence  toward
women  was  also  replete  throughout  the  Middle  Ages.  Literature  of  this time  period
confirms  the  use of  violence  in  the  family,  as well  as, in  society  as a whole  (Gimlin,
1979).  The  Middle  Ages  were  violent  times  and  wife-beating  was  rampant.  The wife  was
always  subordinate  to the  husband  and  husbands  continued  to have  the  right  to punish
their  wives  in  the  event  of  any  misdeeds  (Langley  &  Levy,  1977).
Likewise,  throughout  Europe,  the  concept  that  women  were  property  of  their
husbands  and  subject  to their  husband's  authority  continued  to flourish  (Langley  & Levy,
1977).  In  essence,  the  husband  was  free  to do that  which  he desired  with  all  of  the
property  he owned,  including  his  wife,  with  little  or  no interference  by  anyone  in
authority.
English  common  law  also  deemed  a husband  and  wife  legally  one entity,  with
women  having  no individual  rights  (Jones,  1994).  English  men  therefore  enjoyed  this
privilege  of  common  law  as a legal  right,  thereby  pertnitting  him  the  right  to rule  his
family.  In  addition,  this  English  law  allowed  the  husband,  if  someone  other  than  the
husband  assaulted  his  wife,  to sue for  damages  much  as he would  were  his  other  property
injured  and/or  damaged,  such  as a prize  cow  or  horse  (Smart,  1989).  British  common  law
included  a specific  section  regulating  wife-beating  which  merely  modified  the  weapons
that  a husband  could  use to legally  chastise  his  wife.  The  old  English  law  authorized  the
husband  to chastise  his  wife  with  any  reasonable  instrument.  The  reformed  law  restricted
the definition  of  a reasonable  instrument  which  could  be utilized  to be that  of  "a  rod  not
thicker  than  his  thumb"  (Davidson,  1977,  p.l4).
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Likewise,  in  Wales,  common  law  provided  that  a husband  could  beat  a
disrespectful  wife  a maximum  of  three  strokes  with  a rod  the  length  of  his  foreamn  and
the  thickness  of  his  middle  finger.  In  fact,  the  related  legalist,  William  Blackstone,
recorded  the  English  "Rule  of  Thumb",  enabling  a husband  to chastise  his  wife  with  a
whip  rattan  no bigger  than  his  thumb  in  order  to enforce  the  restraints  of  domestic
discipline  (Davidson,  1978;  Langley  &  Levy,  1977).  The  law,  in  essence,  construed  a
curtain  of  privacy  for  men  surrounding  domestic  violence,  for  such  acts  were  only  a crime
if  committed  against  a man  (Tanner,  1990).
The  first  meaningful  reform  against  family  violence  in  the  history  of  the world
was  led  by  the Puritans  in  the  mid  1600's.  The  Puritans  felt  that  family  violence,  along
with  other  forms  of  wicked  deeds,  threatened  to disrupt  their  divinely  sanctioned
settlement.  They  enacted  The  Body  of  Liberties  in 1641,  which  was  the  first  law
anywhere  in  the  world  condoning  wife-beating.  The  law  contained  a provision  that
maied  women  should  be free  from  bodily  correction  or stripes  by  her  husband  (Crowell
&  Burgess,  1996).  However,  conditions  in  the  American  colonies  were  not  demonstrably
different  than  those  in  Europe  and Waies.  The  legal  system  of  the United  States  slowly
evolved  from  the  British  system.  Accordingly,  so to, were  husbands  permitted  to chastise
their  wives  (Langley  &  Levy,  1977).  Though  the  American  colonies  did  put  forth
concerted  efforts  to protect  people  from  public  crime  in 1740,  the focus  was  solely  on
violence  that  originated  outside  of  the family  as wife  beating  was  considered  merely  a
"private",  moral  crime  (Crowell  &  Burgess,  1996).
Adaption  of  the English  common  law  is ftuther  evidenced  in the  United  States  as
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early  as 1824  when  a Mississippi  Supreme  Court  ruled  in  Bradley  v. State.  In essence,  the
court  stated  that  a husband  should  be permitted  to "moderately  chastise"  his  wife  without
subjecting  himself  to prosecutions  for  assault  and  battery.  This  court  felt  to do otherwise
would  discredit  and  shame  the  parties  involved  (Pleck,  1987).
The  first  English  law  providing  penalties  for  acts of  domestic  violence  was  not
enacted  until  1853.  The  legislation,  entitled,  "Act  for  the  Better  Prevention  of  Aggravated
AssaultS  Upon  Wives  and  Children",  or the  "Good  Wives  Rod",  was  designed  to prevent
abuse  against  women  and  provided  fines  and prison  terms  up to 6 months  for  men
convicted  of  beating  their  wives.  The  legislation  was  spawned  by  several  factors.  The
feminist  movement  of  the 1850's  exposed  abuses  that  occurred  within  the  home  and
paved  the entrance  of  women  into  the  public  world.  Statistics  on  the  number  of  assaults
by men  against  women  and  children  were  published  in 1852,  reporting  that  one  in six
assaults  occurred  within  the  family.  The  article,  the first  of  its  kind,  was  cited  in
numerous  articles  throughout  London  and  drew  a great  deal  of  public  attention.  Though
flogging  was  advocated  as a result  of  the  findings,  the  principle  was  never  enforced.  At
that  time,  Parliament  had  already  passed  a number  of  animal  laws  and  were  apparently
compelled  to extend  the  same  protection  to women  and  children.  In  addition,  the
legislation  was  enacted  in  response  to great  concem  about  the  rising  incidents  of  public
crime  and  it  was  believed  that  punishing  wife  beating  would  help  reduce  other  crime
(Pleck,  1987).
'h'i the  United  States,  however,  many  states  responded  to wife  beating  by
permitting  the  punishment,  if  not  beatings,  of  wives  to go unheeded  and  often  similarly,
At4gsburg Collega Ubra(y
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the  judicial  system  often  avoided  taking  any  position  whatsoever.  As  seen in The  State  v.
, a North  Carolina  Court  ruled  that  wife  beating  was  a matter  best  left  out  of  the
courts.  This  North  Carolina  Court  concluded  that  it  should  not  interfere  with  the  beating
of  a wife  unless  permanent  injuries  were  inflicted  or  there  was  an excess  of  violence.
Without  such  exceptions,  the  court  concluded  it would  not  invade  the  domestic  forum  or
go behind  the  curtain.  Seemingly,  to further  perpetuate  this  form  of  control  over  women,
it was  suggested  that  women  were  too  flighty  and  biologically  unable  to decide  and/or
determine  the  right  things  to do (Langley  &  Levy,  1977).  Thus,  presumably,  it  was  up to
the  husband  to straighten  the  woman  out  from  time  to time  and  therefore  his  duty  to
administer  these  beatings  thus,  controlling  his  property  for  the  presumed  benefit  and  good
of  his  wife.
Similarly,  a North  Carolina  Supreme  Court  decision  in 1874,  upheld  the
husband's  right  to chastise  his  wife,  stating  in essence,  that  acts of  beating  a wife  with  a
stick,  pulling  her  hair,  choking  her,  spitting  in her  face  or  kicking  her  to the floor  were
ancient  privileges.  The  court  further  added  that  if  no permanent  injury  had  been  inflicted,
it was  better  to draw  the  curtain,  shut  out  the  public  and  leave  the  parties  to forgive  and
forget.  The  court  preferred  to leave  the  parties  to themselves  as the  best  method  of
inducing  them  to live  together  as man  and  wife  (Browne,  1987).
The  ending  of  the  Civil  War  in 1861  increased  public  consciousness  of  pain  and
suffering,  generating  the evolution  of  state  intervention  to protect  minority  rights  and
preserve  domestic  life.  Various  women's  movements  began  to challenge  male
dominance.  The  government,  as well  as private  organizations,  began  to broaden  their
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involvement  in  social  and  private  affairs.  Women's  rights,  particularly  in  relation  to
domestic  abuse,  were  also  touched  by  these  changing  times.  A  significant  change  is seen
unexpectedly  with  an Alabama  Court  Ruling  in 1871.  The  case,  Fulgham  v. State, which
was  deemed  a landmark  decision,  determined  that  men  no  longer  had  any  right  to  beat
their  wives  (Pleck,  1987).
The  second  reform  on  family  violence  did  not  occur  until  the  time  period  from
1874  to  approximately  1890.  A  violent  crime  wave  in  the  1870's  made  the  public  fearful
and  reformers  sought  to control  dangerous  and  violent  lower-class  men.  During  these
times,  family  homicide  rates  were  rising,  as well  as the  number  of  incidences  of  family
violence  (Pleck,  1987).  For  the  first  time,  the  Societies  for  the  Prevention  of  Cruelty  to
Children  (SPCCs)  was  established  by  women's  rights  activists.  SPCC's  provided  legal
services  for  victims  of  battering  and  also  initiated  an effort  on  behalf  of  battered  women
and  victims  to regard  family  violence  as a family  problem,  not  a violation  of  criminal  law.
Before  the  founding  of  SPCC's,  there  were  comparatively  few  secular  or  church  courts
that  aided  victims  of  family  violence  (Crowell  &  Burgess,  1996).
As  the  19'  Century  came  to a close,  laws  surrounding  the  treatment  of  women  and
children  merely  continued  to  evolve  with  little  or  no  enforcement.  By  1880,  many  states
passed  legislation  restricting  the  right  of  men  to chastise  their  wives.  Few  however,
provided  any  type  of  punisbment  for  men  who  exceeded  the  limits  of  the  law  (Pleck,
1987).  The  legal  batterings  of  women  remained  permissible  if  the  wife  committed  some
offense  deemed  to  be against  the  husband's  authority  (McCue,  1995).
In  1885,  wife-beating  became  a law  and  order  issue  buried  in  arguments  about  the
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best  means  through  which  to deter  crimes.  Politically,  the  majority  favored  interventions
that  deterred  violent  crime,  rather  than  aiding  victims.  Though  a bill  imposing  public
whippings  to punish  wife-beaters  was  passed  in  three  states,  very  few  wife-beaters  were
ever  punished  and  the  whipping  post  was  eventually  abolished  in  all  three  states  (Pleck,
1987).
The  early  1900's  marked  the  beginning  of  the Progressive  Era.  With  it,  many
reforms  regarding  the  family  were  instituted,  which  included  the  establishment  of  family
courts  or  domestic  relations  courts  across  the  United  States.  In  addition,  family  or
domestic  relations  coiuts  were  established  in Buffalo,  New  York,  in 1910  which
exercised  jurisdiction  over  criminal  matters  exclusively  regarding  the  family.  Although
most  large  U.S.  cities  set up similar  courts  by the 1920's,  domestic  violence  continued  to
be regarded  as domestic  difficulties  rather  than  a violation  of  criminal  law  (Crowell  &
Burgess,  1996).  In  fact,  the official  policy  of  the courts  was  to urge  reconciliation  and
discourage  separation  and  divorce  (Pleck,  1987).
This  approach  to family  matters  continued  virtually  for  the  next  several  decades
until  violent  crime  in  the 1950's  stimulated  the  "rediscovery"  of  family  violence.  As
published,  "Husband-Wife  Homicides  in 1956",  cited  in  numerous  articles,  brought  the
issue  of  domestic  violence  into  the forefront.  This  study,  the  first  of  its  kind,  examined
588 homicides  and  compared  the  ratio  of  wives  killed  by  their  husbands  to that  of  their
counterparts.  It  indicated  that  women  were  four  times  more  likely  to be killed  by  their
husbands  than  vice  versa  (Pleck,  1987).  The  publication  came  at a time  of  great  social
revolution  for  women.  It  followed  the  women's  suffrage  movement  in  the early  part  of
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the  20'h Century,  where  women  were  increasingly  becoming  liberated  from  their  more
traditional  Victorimi  roles.  Furthermore,  as increasingly  large  numbers  of  women  had
become  employed  in  industry  and  labor  during  and  following  World  War  II, women's
traditional  roles  changed  drastically  (Pleck,  1987).
The  third  major  reform  to end  family  violence  occurred  in  the 1960's,  which  was  a
time  of  social  turbulence  and  national  refomi.  Social  movements  of  the  time  emphasized
analyzing  the  source  of  the  problems  that  were  being  addressed  (Pleck,  1987).  The  civil
right's  movement, along with  @owth in women's employment and education, led to the
rebirth  of  the  women's  movement  in  the 1960's.
The  major  focus  of  the  60's  was  the  issue  of  cbild  abuse  (Gil,  1970).  Though
public  attention  was  focused  on  the  home,  the  direct  focus  was  placed  on  violence
inflicted  on innocent  children.  Violence  was  addressed  in an extremely  oversimplified
reform,  entitled  "The  Battered  Child  Syndrome".  The  passage  of  child  abuse  reporting
laws  increased  public  awareness,  which  in  tunn,  led  to an increase  in  reporting.  As  the
extent  of  violence  within  the  home  unraveled,  professionals  began  to realize  that  the issue
was  far  more  complex  than  they  had  originally  believed.  National  surveys  indicated  that
many  different  forms  of  violence  occurred  within  the  home  than  previously  thought
(Pleck,  1987).
Family  violence  continued  to flounder  in  the shadows,  with  virtually  no public
discussion  of  wife  beating  from  the  tiun  of  the century  until  the  mid  1970's.  Newspapers
did  not  even  begin  to report  on  the  occurrence  of  wife  abuse  until  1974  (Pleck,  1987).
The  women's  liberation  movement  rediscovered  wife  beating  in  the 1 970's  and  elevated
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awareness  of  such  to prominent  social  concern  (Schecter, 1982). Police  pmctices, because
of  easy documentation,  were  the  first  to be scrutinized,  followed  by social workers  and
emergency  room  personnel.  Activists  pressured  the  police,  social  agencies  and  federal  and
state  govemment  to respond  to the  problem.  The  women's  movement,  which  relied on
coalitions  with  representatives  who  favored  other  women's  rights  issues,  were  successful
in  passing  new  state  laws  (Pleck,  1987).
The  Chiswick  Center,  established  in  England  in 1971,  was  the  first  neighborhood
center  offering  advice  and support  groups  to women  suffering  firom  abuse,  childcare,  and
a refuge  for  homeless  women.  Similar  shelters  soon  became  established  throughout
England,  and  hence,  the "shelter  movement"  began.  Media  coverage  of  the shelter
movement  between  1975  and 1977  facilitated  the growth  of  the  movement  in  the  United
States  spawning  the establishment  of  the first  women's  refiige  in  the United  States  in St.
Paul,  Minnesota  between  1972-1973  (Pleck,  1987).
The  battered  women's  movement  began  in  England  in 1971,  with  the  grassroots
movement  springing  up in  the  United  States  in  the  mid-1970's  (Pagelow,  1992).  The  re-
emergence  of  the women's  movement  pointed  out  the  huge  amount  of  violence  which
seemed  to be committed  by  men  against  women  in  general  (Schecter,  1982).  Grassroots
efforts  by  victim  advocates  and  former  victims  encouraged  battered  women  to speak  more
openly  about  their  predicatnent  and  to demand  protection  from  the  police  and  the  courts.
Furthermore,  emphasis  on victimization  in  the criminal  justice  system  identified  family
violence  as an important,  complex  phenomenon  confronting  the  police  and  the courts
(Parnas,  1967).
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Womens'  groups  orgarNzed  and  formed  special  interest  groups,  including
legislative  advocacy  groups,  to begin  to demand  protection  and  response  from  the  legal
system.  The  groups,  primarily  grassroots  efforts,  were  powerful  and  dedicated  to their
cause.  "Never  in  American  history  had  there  been  such  an organization  of  crime  victims,
denied  redress,  established  a de facto  system  of  protection  for  themselves  and  other
victims"  (Jones,  1994,  p.lO).
In 1976,  in  response  to what  was  becoming  "standard"  police  practices,  legal  aid
attomeys  filed  suit  on behalf  of  battered  women,  particularly  black  battered  women.  The
suit,  Scott  v. Hart,  was  filed  against  the  police  chief  of  Oakland,  California  for  a breach  of
the statutory  duty  to arrest  under  the California  Penal  Code.  A  comprehensive  settlement
was  approved  by  the court  in  November  of  1978,  which  provided  that  no arrest-avoidance
policies  were  to be used.  The  court  retained  jurisdiction  for  3 years  in  order  to monitor  the
implementation  of  the  new  policy  and  in  response,  the  police  department  promised  to
make  arrests  when  officers  had  probable  cause  to believe  felonious  acts  occurred  within
the  context  of  domestic  violence  (Felder  &  Victor,  1996).
Another  civil  lawsuit  filed  by  71 battered  wives  in 1978  against  the  New  York
City  Police  Department  accused  the  police  of  denying  assistance  after  the  women  had
reported  being  assaulted  by  their  husbands.  As  a result  of  the suit,  the  police  department
in  an out-of-court-settlement  in  June  of  1979,  provided  a proviso  mandating  the  arrest  of
wife  beaters  when  there  was  reasonable  cause  to believe  the  man  had  committed  a crime.
Moreover,  it  was  stipulated  that  the  police  department  would  send  one or more  officers  in
response  to every  call  from  a woman  who  said  her  husband  had  assaulted  her  and/or
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threatened  her  with  assault  (Fields,  1977).
Yet  another  landmark  class  action  suit,  Bruno  v. Codd,  was  filed  by  a group  of
battered  women  against  the  New  York  Police  Commission  and  the  City  of  New  York  in
1980  for  failure  to enforce  laws  against  men  who  committed  domestic  abuse.  The  trial
judge  ruled  that  the  police,  regardless  of  the  severity  of  the  charge,  could  not
automatically  decline  to make  an arrest  simply  because  the  assailant  was  either  married  or
living  with  the  victim  (Felder  &  Victor,  1996).
The  numerous  civil  class-action  suits  that  were  filed  challenged  equal  protection
rights  for  battered  women.  Courts  increasingly  ruled  that  battered  women  were  entitled  to
equal  protection  and  that  law  enforcement  must  provide  that  protection.  This  increased
pressure  on  the  legal  system  to change  policies  and  recognize  that  violence  perpetrated  by
intimates  was  a crime,  regardless  of  whether  the  parties  were  married.
Accordingly,  the  President  and  Congress  declared  the  elimination  of  violence  in
the  home  to  be a national  goal  in  the  late  70's.  Oregon  became  the  first  state  to enact
legislation  mandating  arrest  in  domestic  violence  cases  when  it  adopted  the  Family  Abuse
Prevention  Act,  which  served  as a model  for  the  nation.  In  1978  Minnesota  became  the
first  state  to allow  probable  cause  (warrantless)  arrest  cases  in  domestic  assault.  Many
states  followed  suit  and  enacted  laws  concerning  wife  abuse  in  the  late  1970's,  many  of
which  repealed  spousal  immunity  from  torts  and  established  more  effective  criminal  court
procedures.  By  1980,  all  but  six  states  had  passed  such  laws  (Crowell  &  Burgess,  1996).
In  1984,  another  landmark  suit  was  filed  on  behalf  of  Tracey  Thurman  who  was
left  permanently  disfigured  and  partially  paralyzed,  resulting  from  her  estranged  husband
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who  repeatedly  stabbed  her  while  police  officers  stood  by  vvatching.  Tracey  sued  the  city
of  Torrington  and  24 individual  officers,  advocating  that  the  police  department's  policy  of
non-arrest  in  domestic  violence  situations  was  unconstitutional.  She claimed  a violation
of  her  14th Amendment  rights,  which  state  that  no person  should  be denied  the equal
protection  of  the  laws.  Tracey  was  awarded  $2.9 million  in  damages  and  settled  out  of
court  for  1.9  million  (Jones,  1994).  Though  the courts  were  beginning  to respond  to the
injustices  victims  of  family  violence  suffered,  Tracey's  case made  it  more  apparent  that
law  enforcement  was  still  lagging  and  that  more  had  to be done  about  this  devastating
social  issue.
The  istory  of  reforms  against  family  violence  is not  unlike  that  of  other  social
movements  in  the  United  States  in  two  ways.  First,  reforms  against  family  violence  have
occurred  in  response  to social  and  political  conditions  of  their  time,  rather  than  worsening
conditions  in  the  home.  The  reforms  have  often  been  led  by  highly  educated  people  that
have  offered  various  solutions  to social  problems  that  did  not  directly  affect  them.  As
with  other  social  movements,  the family  violence  movement  has also  suffered  from
limited  resources,  lack  of  funding  and  sparse  programs.  Reforms  against  family  violence
have  also  suffered  from  periods  of  sustained  attention  followed  by  periods  of  apathy
(Pleck,  1987).
One  aspect,  however,  has set reforms  against  family  violence  apart  from  other
movements  and  has consistently  made  this  social  issue  more  controversial;  the  Family
Ideal,  which  are distinct  ideas  and  beliefs  about  the family,  particularly  family  privacy,
conjugal  and  parental  rights  and  family  stability.  One  of  the crucial  elements  of  the
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Family  Ideal,  domestic  privacy,  was the belief  that  the  family  and  the  home  should  be
distinct  and  separate  institutions  from  the  public  world  and  the  rest  of  society.  Domestic
privacy  was  believed  to be valuable,  yet  fragile,  therefore  government  was  to refrain  from
intervening  in  it. Intervention  in  the  home  has historically  been  viewed  as a violation  of
fatnily  intimacy.  Even  now,  argiu'nents  can  be made  that  the  family  has a constitutional
right  to privacy  and  that  the  home  is the setting  where  intimacy  can  flourish,  not  in  the
public  setting  (Pleck,  1987).
The  second  element  of  the  Family  Ideal  has been  the  belief  in conjugal  and
parental  rights.  As  discussed  previously,  the husband  has historically  possessed  the right
of  correction  or  physical  discipline  with  his  wife  and  children.  This  right  of  correction  has
historically  served  as justification  for  assaults  by  husbands  and  parents.  Even  in  current
times,  parents  still  have  the  right  to physically  discipline  their  children  via  spanking
(Pleck,  1987).
The  third  element  of  the Family  Ideal  is the  belief  in  the  preservation  of  the
family.  Historically,  women  were  thought  to be dependent  upon  their  family  for  their
happiness  and  have  been  bound  to marriage  and  their  families  by  a sense  of  duty  and
obligation.  In earlier  times,  as the feminist  movements  began,  it  was  felt  that  the
questioning  by women  of  the sacrifices  they  had  made  would  threaten  family  stability
(Pleck,  1987).
Reforms  against  family  violence  have  historically  asserted  that  family  violence  is
not  a private  issue,  but  rather  a public  matter.  Reforms  have  offered  remedies,  including
state  interventions  in  the  family,  and  have  challenged  the  view  that  the  family  and
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marriage  should  be preserved  at all  costs.  Reforms  have  also  asserted  that  women  and
children  have  rights  and  their  individual  liberties  upheld  and  protected.
The  success,  or lack  thereof,  of  family  violence  reforms  has depended  on  how  the
reformers  regarded  the  Family  Ideal.  Reforms  that  fiercely  and  openly  criticized  the Ideal
were  defeated.  The  most  successful  reforms  have  been  politically  circumspect  and
presented  their  remedies  as a means  of  preserving  the  home.  The  use of  personal
influence,  new  definitions  of  family  violence  and  reform  coalitions  have  contributed  to
legislative  success.  The  efforts  deemed  the  most  successfiil  were  interventions  whose  top
priority  was  victim  safety  and  those  that  facilitated  and  implemented  concrete  resources.
Successful  or not,  in  all  the  reform  periods,  small  organizations  and  very  dedicated
individuals  have  made  family  violence  a social  issue  that  demanded  public  attention
(Pleck,  1987).
DEFINITION  OF  THE  PROBLEM
The  most  recent  emergence  of  family  violence  as a social  problem  occurred  as a
result  of  three  major  trends  in  this  era. The  American  family  was  seen as a tranquil
system,  often  a solace  from  the  rigors  of  daily  life  (Pleck,  1987).  All  three  trends
challenged  this  view  and  each  proved  the view  disillusioned.
The  first  trend,  the discovery  of  child  abuse  through  medical  and  sociological
research  in  the  mid  60's,  focused  public  attention  on violence  that  occurred  in  the home
(Gil,  1970).  National  surveys  indicated  that  many  different  forms  of  violence  occurred
within  the  home  than  was  previously  thought  (Pleck,  1987).  As  the  extent  of  violence
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within  the  home  unraveled,  professionals  began  to realize  that  the  issue  was  far  more
complex  than  they  had  originally  believed.
Second,  the  re-emergence  of  the  women's  movement  helped  make  the  use of
physical  force  as a conflict  resolution  and  control  tactic  within  the  home  visible
(Schecter,  1982).  Domestic  violence  came  to be defined  as not  simply  physical  violence,
but  a systematic  pattern  of  domination  and  control  (Pagelow,  1984).  Domestic  violence,
once  thought  of  as a series  of  isolated  blow-ups,  emerged  as "a  process  of  deliberate
intimidation  intended  to coerce  the  victim  to do the  will  of  the  victimizer  (Jones,  1994,
p.88).  It becatne  increasingly  more  apparent  that  a great  deal  of  battering  was  hidden  and
that  batterers  utilize  a wide  range  of  abusive  acts in  order  to gain  control  over  partners.
Acts  utilized  include  psychological,  emotional,  sexual  and  physical  abuse,  which  serve  to
control  women  through  isolation  and  fear  (Pagelow,  1984).
As  battered  women  increasingly  presented  themselves  to grassroots  organizations,
advocates  and  lobbying  groups  defined  the  range  of  services  needed  for  victims  of  family
violence  as well  as the  limitations  of  the  existing  legal  remedies  available  to victims.
Grassroots  organizations  took  a leadership  role  in  initiating  legislative  change  (Schecter,
1982).  Advocates  of  battered  women  mobilized  legal  institutions  for  interventions  with
symbolic  and  general  deterrent  effects.  The  reforms  also  included  goals  of  protecting
women  through  the  mobilization  of  extralegal  services  and  the development  of  referral
linkages.  The  inclusion  of  legal  sanctions  in  a network  of  services  helped  to expand  social
control,  designed  to protect  women  victims.  However,  for  legal  institutions,  the  reforms
focused  on prioritizing  a class  of  offenders  and  offenses  for  adjudication.  Goals  and
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expectations  differed  in  these  two  perspectives.  In  pursuing  victim  protection  goals,  legal
institutions  were  asked  to refocus  their  efforts  on  the  protection  of  victims  and  the
coordination  of  extralegal  services.
The  third  trend  occurred  as the  result  of  criminal  justice  research  conducted  in  the
1970's,  which  identified  family  violence  as an important  and complex  issue  confronting
the  police  and  courts  (Panias,  1967).  As  public  awareness  of  the seriousness  of  family
violence  increased,  family  violence  became  a public  policy  issue.  Greater  demands  were
placed  on the  police  and  the  criminal  justice  system  for  greater  protection  for  victims  and
more  consistent  enforcement  of  criminal  laws  (Lerman,  1981).
The  Minneapolis  Domestic  Violence  Experiment,  a landmark  study  conducted  in
1984,  reported  arrest  to be the  most  effective  way  for  law  enforcement  to deter  violence
in domestic  abuse  cases.  Drawing  heavily  from  the Minneapolis  Experiment,  the  United
States  Attorney  General's  Office  established  a Task  Force  on Domestic  Violence  in 1984
to investigate  the seriousness  of  domestic  violence.  The  task  force  concluded,  after
studying  the "darker  side  of  American  life,"  that  the  nation  had  much  more  work  to do in
dealing  with  domestic  violence  than  had  been  done  in the  past.  The  report  stated  that
domestic  violence  must  be seen as a crime  and that  the legal  response  to domestic
violence  must  be guided  by  the  nature  of  the violent  acts,  not  the  relationship  between  the
offender  and  the victim.  The  task  force  cautioned  that  the  public  must  be aware  of  the
nature  of  the  problem  as well  as their  obligations,  as citizens,  in  combating  it. The  task
force  recommended  developing  strong  coordinated  responses  to domestic  violence  and
concluded  by stating  that  if  violence  is always  reported  and  the  legal  system  always
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responds,  the  deterrent  effects  will  be swift  and  legal  penalties  great.  Finally,  the
publication  called  for  law  enforcement  and  criminal  justice  agencies  to  recognize  family
violence  as a crime  and  recommended  arrest  as the  preferred  response  (Attorney
General's  Task  Force  on  Domestic  Violence,  I984).
As  national  awareness  of  family  violence  increased,  individual  states  began  taking
steps  to investigate  the  problem  on  a state  level.  In  Wisconsin,  a 1986  report  published
the  following  statistics:
- Nationally,  30%  of  female  homicide  victims  are  killed  by  family  members  or
boyfriends
- Nationally,  70%  of  all  emergency  room  assault  cases  are  wife  beatings;  20%  of
all  emergency  room  visits  by  women  are  attributed  to domestic  abuse
- Each  year  an estimated  200,000  Wisconsin  women  are  battered.
Another  study  cited  in  the  report  indicated  that  nationally,  75%  of  metropolitan
police  time  is expended  to respond  to domestic  abuse  incidents;  rural  police  and  sheriff'  s
departments  estimate  that  more  than  35%  of  their  time  is devoted  to  responding  to such
incidents  (Wisconsin  Governor's  Council,  et al.,  1986).
According  to Wisconsin  Legislative  Representative  Shirley  Krug,  co-author  of  the
mandatory  arrest  bill  in  Wisconsin,  domestic  violence  was  monitored  in  Wisconsin  for
several  years  following  the  release  of  the  reports.  During  the  monitoring  period,
Minnesota  eriacted  the  first  mandatory  arrest  policy,  with  many  states  following  suit.
Following  the  lead  of  Minnesota,  the  Milwaukee  Police  Department  enacted  a pro-arrest
policy,  which  encouraged  arrest  in  domestic  violence  assaults,  though  did  not  mandate
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arrest.  The  pro-arrest  policy  was  successful  in  Milwaukee.  It  was  felt  that  if  a pro-arrest
policy  could  be successful  in  Milwaukee,  Wisconsin's  largest  metropolitan  area,  the
policy  could  be enacted  state  wide  and  be successful  (H.  McAbee,  personal
communication  July  12,  1998).
1987  Wisconsin  Assembly  Bill  224  (mandatory  arrest),  was  drafted  and  sent  to
usual  interest  groups,  including  advocacy  groups  and  law  enforcement.  An  advisory
council  was  appointed  by  the  Governor  to  examine  the  implications  and  potential  effects
of  the  proposed  bill.  Though  a majority  of  law  enforcement  agencies  and  programs  for
battered  women  throughout  the  state  supported  the  proposed  bill,  the  bill  was  met  with
opposition  from  the  Wisconsin  Coalition  Against  Domestic  Violence  (WCADV),  the
strongest  lobbying  group  in  Wisconsin  for  battered  women.  The  WCADV  expressed
concern  that  arrest  would  place  victims  in  greater  danger  of  retaliatory  violence  from  their
partners  following  an arrest.  Meetings  were  held  to address  concerns  regarding  the
legislation  and  personnel  from  Representative  Krug's  office  contacted  several  states  that
already  had  mandatory  arrest  policies  in  place.  Their  investigation  found  that  many  of  the
concerns  were  simply  not  the  case  in  states  with  existing  arrest  policies  (H.  McAbee,
personal  communication  June  12,  1998).  The  Wisconsin  Governor's  Advisory  Council  on
Domestic  Abuse  concluded  the  examination  by  expressing  support  of  the  proposed
legislation  to members  of  the  Assembly  Committee  on Criminal  Justice  and  Public  Safety
(Wisconsin  Governor's  Council  on  Domestic  Abuse,  1987).  When  it  became  apparent
that  the  bill  was  going  to  pass,  WCADV  took  a pro-active  stance  and  mobilized  resources
to influence  specific  provisions  of  the  legislation  (Wanless,  1996).
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Various  interest  groups,  supporting  and  opposing  the  bill  testified  before the
committee  regarding  the  importance  of  potential  impacts  of  the  legislation.
Representative  Shirley  Krug,  the driving  force  behind  the  creation  of  the  legislation  and
revisions,  thereof,  provided  the  following  committee  testimonya
"  A  great  deal  of  recent  evidence  points  to arrest  as being  the  course  of  action
most  likely  to reduce  repeat  (domestic  abuse  offenses)..."  (Wisconsin  Legislative  Council
[WLC],  1996, J).3)
"Don't  the  police  always  arrest  people  suspected  of  violent  assaults?  The  answer
is that,  sadly,  they  don't,  especially  when  the  assault  takes  place  in  the  home/family
setting.  A  man's  home  is his  castle  has been  the  nile  of  tradition.  In  many  places,  this
tradition  takes  precedence  when  a law  enforcement  officer  is deciding  whether  or  not  to
arrest  the  perpetrator  of  a violent  assault"  (WLC,  1996,  pg. 3-4).
"The  traditional  alternatives  to arrest,  counseling  the  parties  or separating  them
temporarily  have  been  shown  to be far  less effective  in  reducing  repeat  assaults.  The
argument  that  arresting  an abuser  increases  the chance  that  violent  retribution  will  be
directed  at the  victim  is simply  not  supported  by  the  evidence"  (WLC,  1996,  p.4).
In  response  to the social  problem  of  domestic  violence,  the domestic  abuse  and
prosecution  law  was  created  by 1987  WI  Act  346.  Legislation  was  introduced  in  the 1989
and 1995  legislative  sessions  in  response  to suggestions  for  improving  the administration
and  implementation  of  the law.  The  legislation,  1989  AB  249  and 1995  AB  229,  was
enacted  as 1989  WI  Act  293 which  became  effective  May  8, 1990  and  WI  Act  304  which




Historically,  theories  explaining  the  phenomenon  of  violence  against  intimates
have  attributed  causal  factors  of  violence  to various  variables.  Though  each  individual
theory  is insufficient  on  its  own  and  does  not  provide  an integrated  framework  for
understanding  the  phenomenon,  it  is imperative  to examine  the  interplay  of  existing
theories  within  the  context  of  the  dynamics  of  domestic  violence  (Fagan,  1996).
Individual  models  of  violence,  often  characteristic  of  early  research  approaches,
attributed  domestic  violence  as resulting  from  individual  pathology  (McKenry,  Julian  &
Gazazzi,  1995).  More  recent  individual  models  attribute  violent  behavior  primarily  to
individual  charactersistics  of  the  perpetrator  and  to a lesser  degree,  to the  victim  (Dwyer,
Smokowski,  Bricout  &  Wodarski,  1995).  Individual  personality  traits  or  disorders  that
have  been  suggested  to play  a role  in  the  etiology  of  domestic  violence  include
impulsivity,  suspicion  of  others,  antisocial  behavior,  compulsivity,  low  self-esteem,
mental  illness,  substance  abuse  and  the  ability  to ascribe/internalize  blame  (O'Leary,
1993).  In  addition,  psychological  disorders  are known  to  be significantly  present  in  men
who  are involved  in  higher  levels  of  physical  aggression  than  men  in  the  general
population  (McKenry,  et al.,  1995).  Though  individual  models  of  violence  have  been
valuable  in  explaining  domestic  violence,  they  have  not  proven  useful  in  identifying  risk
factors  associated  with  violence  (Dwyer,  et al.,  1995).
Sociological  models  of  violence,  on  the  other  hand,  attribute  violence  to social
programming,  rather  than  biological  programming.  Sociological  models  do  not  focus  on
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single  characteristics  of  social  life,  but  rather,  the examination  of  social  stnictures
(Dwyer,  et al., 1995),  utilizing  family  dynamics  to explain  how  social  structures  allow
violence  among  partners.  Specifically,  the  model  emphasizes  family  structure,  StreSs,
transmission  of  violence  from  one generation  to the  next,  and  family  interactional  patterns
(Gelles,  1993).  While  sociological  models  are valuable  for  their  diversity,  they  fail  to
focus  on  one single  aspect  of  social  life  and  have  limited  use in  identifying  solutions
(Dwyer,  et. al., 1995).
The  feminist  theory  of  violence  examines  factors  specific  to violence  perpetrated
against  women  by  male  partners  (Dobash  &  Dobash,  1979;  Martin,  1981;  Roy,  1976;
Walker,  1984).  This  perspective  emphasizes  the  historical  tradition  of  patriarchal  family,
not  as a discrete,  measurable  variable,  but  a multidimensional,  complex  system  of  male
power  in society.  Patriarchy  has two  components;  a structure  wherein  men  have  more
power  and  privilege  than  women  and  one  that  exists  within  an ideology  that  legitimized
this  arrangement  (Smith,  1990).  Feminist  theory  suggests  that  husbands  who  subscribe  to
familial  patriarchy  ideals  are more  likely  to assault  their  wives  than  husbands  who  do not
subscribe  to such  ideals  (Smith,  1990).  Though  feminist  scholars  are increasingly
attributing  violence  against  women  to a patriarchal  structure,  the  perspective  provides
only  a single-variable  explanation  and does  not  offer  an integrated  framework  for
understanding  violence  (Dwyer,  et al., 1995).
The  emphasis  of  research  conducted  in  the 1970's  and 1980's  stressed  the deterrent
value  of  police  actions.  As  society  became  increasingly  more  conservative,  focus  shifted
toward  punitive  solutions  for  offenders  (Buzawa  &  Buzawa,  1993).  Deterrence  theory
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provided  the  theoretical  framework  that  facilitated  the  revolution  of  the criminalizatxon  of
domestic  violence.
The  concept  of  general  deterrence  has been  utilized  to theorize  the  effectiveness
of  legal  sanctions  as a form  of  crime  control.  Deterrence  theory  is based  on  the  belief  that
human  behavior  is, to some  degree,  rational.  Deterrence  is conceptuahzed  as a
psychological  process  that  an individual  goes through  before committing  a crime. It is
believed  that  individuals  weigh  the  costs  and  benefits  of  committing  the  act  in
comparison  to other  alternative  actions.  The  greater  the  individual's  perception  of  certain,
swift  and/or  severe  legal  sanctions,  the greater  the  perceived  cost  and  thus,  the greater  the
chances  of  deterrence  (Williams  &  Hawkins,  1986).
General  deterrence  theory  distinguishes  between  formal  and  informal  constraints.
Informal  sanctions  are derived  from  social  sanctions,  such  as the influence  of  arrest  upon
one's  marriage,  employment  or social  standing,  while  the  possibility  of  arrest  is
considered  a formal  constraint  (Sherman,  1992).  Arrest  is theorized  to have  specific
deterrent  effects,  thus  reducing  recidivism  in  punished  individuals.  It  is further  theorized
that  arrest  acts  as a strong  deterrent  only  among  those  who  suffer  informal  social
sanctions,  such  as feelings  of  embarrassment  and shame  resulting  from  the act  of  arrest
(Herzberger,  1996).
One  study  explored  the  influence  of  perceptions  of  formal  and  informal  sanctions
on arrests  for  domestic  violence.  Results  indicated  that  various  indirect  costs  contributed
to a general  sense  of  fear  about  arrest.  However,  it  is unclear  whether  an actual  arrest
would  produce  the  same  findings  as the  results  were  based  on  men's  perceptions  of
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"hypothetical"  arrest  for  domestic  violence  (William  &  Hawkins,  1989).
Another  shidy  attempted  to  identify  conditions  of  individual  consistency.  Results
did  report  a negative  association  between  perceived  certainty  and  self-reported
involvement  in  crime,  but  little  evidence  that  perceived  certainty  had  such  an effect
(Paternoster,  Saltzman,  Waldo  &  Chiricos,  1983).  Only  one  study  reported  evidence  of
significant  negative  associations  between  perceived  severity  of  sanctions  and  crime
(Grasmick  &  Bryjak,  1980).
There  have  been  many  criticisms  of  deterrence  theories.  The  meaning  of  deterrent
effect  within  the  context  of  domestic  violence  has  failed  to  be clearly  defined  (Williams
&  Hawkins,  1992).  Recidivism  has  been  narrowly  defined,  which  has  led  to a narrow
perspective  on  the  effects  of  various  interventions.  Studies  have  considered  domestic
violence  one  phenomenon,  rather  than  a complex  issue  with  different  motivational
factors.  Further,  deterrence  theories  typically  have  not  examined  the  effects  of  important
factors,  such  as service  provisions  to  victims  (McCord,  1992).  Finally,  the  reported
research  is academic,  difficult  to  understand  and  is less  accessible  to clinicians  and  victim
advocates  (Lerman,  1992).
General  deterrence  theory,  as other  theories,  is prone  to problems  of  measurement
and  interaction.  Most  measures  have  vaguely  distinguished  between  perceptions  of
certainty  and  severity,  assuming  that  evaluation  of  severity  is constant  across  respondents
(Grasmick  &  Bryjak,  1980).  In  addition,  most  general  deterrence  studies  have  utilized
cross-sectional  designs,  and  correlated  past  crime  involvement  with  current  perceptions  of
sanctions.  Sensitivity  in  research  designs  to  the  problem  of  temporal  order  has  raised
Page  -31-
serious  questions  about  the accuracy  of  recall  and  correspondence  or lack  thereof,
between  what  people  say they  will  do and  what  they  actually  do (Williams  & Hawkins,
1986).
Current  research  has attempted  to broaden  the  concept  of  deterrence  to include
formal  sanctions  augmented  by  the imposition  of  informal  sanctions.  In  this  broadened
concept,  infortnal  sanctions  are categorized  as stigma,  attachment  cost  and  commitment
costs,  with  commitment  costs  arising  from  the  individual's  stake  in  conformity.  However,
few  studies  have  tested  this  broadened  concept  of  deterrence  as it  applies  to domestic
violence  (Williams  &  Hawkins,  1986).
There  have  been  numerous  theoretical  frameworks  utilized  to develop  research
models  for  domestic  violence,  all  of  which  have  been  specific  to diverse  interest  groups.
Although  violence  in  the  home  has been  recognized  as a societal  issue,  research
conducted,  as well  as programs  and  policies  that  have  been  developed,  has not  followed  a
unified  approach.  For  example,  family  violence  research  which  identified  the causes  and
remedies  within  individual  perpetrators  has had  a strong  value  to criminal  justice  policy
development,  such  that  research  on  offenders  has greater  use in  a system  geared  toward
sanctioning  and  control  of  offenders.  Research  approaches  based  on feminist  theories,
such  as emotional  terror  and explanations  of  violence  based  on a patriarchal  social
stnucture,  have  had  little  use in  the criminal  justice  system  where  codified  definitions
determine  prosecution  (Fagan,  1988).  Further,  distinctions  between  physical  and  non-
physical  violence  can  lead  to very  different  conclusions  about  behavioral  change  and  the
impact  on law  reform  (Fagan  &  Wexler,  1985).  Other  family  violence  research  has
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focused  on  identifying  explanations  as well  as interventions  that  will  decrease  the  risk  of
reoccurrence  for  victims  (Fagan,  1988).
The  result  has been  many  parallel  approaches  of  addressing  interventions  to end
domestic  violence,  with  each  utilizing  different  research  models  and  bodies  of  knowledge
to foster  its approach.  Research  conducted  in one  paradigm  has had  limited  use in  other
social  arenas  and  in  essence,  provided  only  a portion  of  the big  picture.  Research
knowledge  which  has fit  within  existing  social  organizations  and  stnicture  of  the  criminal
justice  system  has led  to significant  changes  in  both  policy  and  practice.  However,
knowledge  that  has not  fit  has been  excluded  from  policy  development,  which  has led  to
significant  gaps  in  policy  development,  particularly  in  victim  safety  (Fagan,  1988).
As  research  increasingly  has emphasized  the deterrent  effects  of  police
interventions,  focus  has shifted  to law  enforcement's  response  to domestic  violence.
Historically,  law  enforcement  has been  the only  social  agency  available  to victims  of
violence  all  hours  of  the  night  and  day  (Hutchison,  Hirschel  &  Pesackis,  1994).  However,
the  most  frequent  complaints  of  victims  have  been  that  police  did  little  or  nothing  helpfiil
when  and  if  they  responded  to domestic  calls  (Martin,  1976;  Pagelow,  1980).  Though
arrest  was  rare,  occurring  in  only  3 to 27%  of  all  domestic  disturbances  (Elk  &  Johnson,
1989;  Sherman  &  Berk,  1984),  research  indicates  that  law  enforcement  receives  more
calls  reporting  domestic  violence  than  any  other  type  of  crime  (Browne,  1995).
The  traditional  police  response  to domestic  incidents  was  one of  temporary  order
maintenance.  This  approach  was  advocated  by  the  police  command  and  followed  by line
personnel  (Davis  &  Taylor,  1997).  Domestic  violence  calls  were  often  assigned  low
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priority  (Lerman,  1983,  1984;  Parnas,  1971;  U.S.  Commission  on Civil  Rights, 1982) and
arrest  was  avoided  except  in  cases  resulting  in  severe  injury  (Martin,  1978). In essence,
law  enforcement  would  respond  reluctantly  to calls,  attempt  to restore order and peace
between  disputants  and leave  (Hutchison  et aI., 1994).
The  traditional  avoidance  response  of  law  enforcement  has been attributed  to
several  factors.  First,  violence  within  the  home  was  considered  to be a private,  family
matter  (Davis  &  Taylor,  1997).  Historically,  the  closer  the  relationship  between  victim
and offender,  the  least  likely  an arrest  would  be made  (Buzawa  &  Buzawa,  1993).  In  fact,
previous  research  indicates  that  the  majority  of  officers  believed  that  they  had  no
legitimate  role  in  domestic  disturbances  (Breci  &  Simmons,  1987;  Homant  & Kennedy,
1985;  Waiter,1981).  Intervening  in family  disputes  was  not  regarded  as "real  police
work"  by  law  enforcement,  but  rather,  more  as social  work,  hence  undesirable  (Buzawa  &
Buzawa,  1990;  Parnas,  1971).
In  addition,  officers  leamed  that  victims  often  give  incomplete  and  untruthful
accounts  of  the  situation  and  officers  leanned  to be wary  and  skeptical  (Buzawa  &
Buzawa,  1993).  Female  victims  were  often  perceived  to be uncooperative  and  officers  felt
that  taking  formal  action  against  the  abuser  would  be a waste  of  time  because  the  victim
would  be unlikely  to follow  through  with  prosecution  (Parnas,  1967;  U. S. Commission
on  Civil  Rights,  1982).  Further  concern  existed  that  taking  action  against  the abuser
would  negatively  effect  the  rest  of  the family  that  was  financially  dependent  on the abuser
(Pamas,  1967).
Prior  to mandatory  arrest,  law  enforcement's  role  was  limited  in responding  to
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domestic  disturbances  by  arrest  procedures,  or  lack  thereof,  and  their  individual
application  of  non-formalized  value  judgments.  Respectively,  arrest  could  be made  for
acts  that  occurred  in  the  officers'  presence  and  those  incidents  where  officers  believe  the
acts  were  serious  enough  to  warrant  a battery  charge.  Inevitably,  however,  principally
spurred  by  the  frequency  and  severity  of  violent  domestic  confrontations,  law
enforcement  also  groped  for  direction.  In  the  absence  of  clear  prolongations,  domestic
violence  cases  were  often  handled  differently  than  cases  which,  under  the  same
circumstances,  would  be deemed  a crime.  Therefore,  law  enforcement  was  often  placed  in
an extremely  difficult  situation.
During  the  1960's,  the  traditional  order-maintenance  approach  in  dealing  with
domestic  violence  was  revised  to include  a more  professional  twist.  Following
recommendations  set forth  by  the  Attomey  General's  Task  Force  on  Family  Violence,
police  practices  were  revised  to include  mediation  and  crisis  intervention.  These  methods
were  seen  as more  effective  in  dealing  with  families  (Davis  &  Taylor,  1997).  However,
reservations  developed  in  the  70's,  due  in  part  to difficulties  of  mediating  between  parties
that  are  not  of  equal  power  status  within  the  relationship.  In  addition,  frequently  when
law  enforcement  left  the  residence,  the  husband  would  resume  beating,  leaving  the  wife
frustrated  and  defenseless.
As  information  and  knowledge  was  accumulated,  society  and  its  enforcers  began
to get  important  facts.  Research  indicated  that  repeated  lectures  and/or  gentle  advice
given  by  police  officers  to batterers  had  no effect  on  domestic  violence  (Langley  &  Levy,
1977).  The  reservations  surrounding  mediation,  coupled  with  research  and  infringement
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of  victim's  right  by  the failure  of  police  to enforce  the  law,  led  to the  advocacy  of  arrest
(Hutchison  et al., 1994).
The  revolution  of  the  criminalization  of  domestic  violence  can be attributed  to
numerous  factors  previously  discussed.  The  implementation  of  mandatory  arrest  policies
for  domestic  assaults  has been  attributed  to the  landmark  1984  publication  of  the
Minneapolis  Domestic  Violence  Experiment.  The  study,  funded  by  the  National  Institute
of  Justice,  was  conducted  by  the  Police  Foundation,  and  the first  controlled,  randomized
test  of  the effectiveness  of  arrest  for  any  offense  based  on general  deterrence  theory
(Schtnidt  &  Sherman,  1993).  The  Minneapolis  Domestic  Violence  Experiment  was
designed  as a test  of  specific  deterrence  theory.  Police  responses  were  randomly  assigned
and included  arrest,  some  form  of  advice  or mediation,  or separation.  The  effectiveness  of
the  different  police  interventions  was  measured  by criminal  justice  data  on  the  suspects,
which  indicated  if  law  enforcement  was  called  back  out  to the  residence,  as well  as if  a
subsequent  arrest  was  made.  Victim  data,  which  were  designed  to measure  the frequency
and  seriousness  of  violence  after  each  intervention,  were  collected  in  initial  face  to face
interviews,  as well  as telephone  interviews  every  2 weeks  for  24 weeks  (Sherman  &  Berk,
1984).
Results  indicated  that  domestic  violence  cases most  frequently  responded  to by
law  enforcement  were  disproportionately  unmarried  couples  with  lower  than  average
educational  levels,  disproportionately  minority  or mixed  race  and  those  who  had  prior
violent  incidents  with  police  interventions  (Sherman  &  Berk,  1984).  Further,  arrest  data
indicated  that  separation  of  the  two  parties  produced  the highest  recidivism,  arrest
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produced  the lowest  and  giving  advice  or  mediating  were  indistinguishable  from the other
two  effects.  Arrest  data  also  indicated  that  26%  of  those  separated  committed  a repeat
assault,  compared  to 13%  of  those  arrested.  All  of  the  police  interventions  effectively
stopped  the  violence  for  a 24 hour  period  following  the  reunion  of  the  couples.  The
authors  concluded  that  arrest  intervention  "certainly  did  not  make  things  worse  and may
well  have  made  things  better"  (Sherman  &  Berk,  1984,  p.269).
Despite  the  promising  results  of  the  research,  the  study  had  several  limitations.
First,  the design  only  applied  to simple  (misdemeanor)  domestic  assaults,  where  both the
suspect  and  victim  were  present  when  law  enforcement  arrived.  Cases  of  life-threatening
attacks  of  serious  injuries  labeled  as felonies  (aggravated  assault)  were  excluded  from  the
design  for  ethical  reasons  (Sherman  &  Berk,  1984).
Second,  there  was  deviation  from  the  initial  design  due to the likelihood  that  many
officers  failed  to fiilly  follow  the  experimental  design.  This  is illustrated  as follows:  99%
of  the suspects  targeted  for  arrest  were  arrested,  only  78%  of  those  to receive  mediation
or advice  did  and  only  73%  of  those  to be sent  away  from  the  residence  were  actually  sent
away.  Officer  deviation  from  the  design  was  also  found  in  victim  outcome  measures  in
that  follow-up  efforts  with  victims  only  had  a 62%  completion  rate.  The  officers  involved
in  the study  reported  that  they  were  less likely  during  the follow-up  period  to record  an
incident  if  the offender  was  not  present  at the scene.  In  terms  of  direct  officer  treatment
interventions,  the content  of  the advice  or separation  interventions  is unclear.
Further,  in  terms  of  the research  design  itself,  the outcome  measures  had  uncertain
construct  validity  as the  measures  more  than  likely  reflect  a large  number  of  repeat
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offenses.  The  authors  point  out  that  the  impact  for  arrest  in  the  outcome  measure  may  be
a reluctance  on  the  part  of  victims  to  call  the  police  as police  intervention  may  have been
undesirable.  Finally,  generalizability  is questionable  as Minneapolis  is not  representattve
of  all  urban  areas  (Sherman  &  Berk,  1984).
The  authors  reported  no  evidence  that  deterrence  will  work  in  general,  but  their
findings  indicated  that  swift  imposition  of  a sanction  (temporary  incarceration)  may  deter
male  offenders  in  domestic  assault  cases.  The  authors  clearly  stated  that  they  did not
favor  requiring  arrests  in  all  misdemeanor  assault  cases,  but  rather,  favored  a presumption
of  arrest  policy;  arrest  should  be made  unless  there  are  clear  reasons  why  arrest  would  be
counterproductive.  Despite  the  authors'  cautioning  against  mandatory  arrest  policies  until
further  studies  were  conducted  (Sherman  &  Berk,  1984),  within  8 years,  legislatures  in  15
states  and  the  District  of  Columbia  moved  to enact  laws  requiring  police  to arrest  in  all
probable  cause  incidents  of  domestic  violence  (Schrnidt  &  Sherman,  1993).
The  results  of  the  Minneapolis  Domestic  Abuse  Experiment  raised  several
important  questions.  Primarily,  could  law  enforcement  intervention,  specifically  arrest,  be
effective  in  dealing  with  domestic  abuse?  The  results  also  warranted  investigation  into
alternative  interventions  that  could  bring  immediate  relief  (Schmidt  &  Sherman,  1993).  In
an effort  to find  support,  or  lack  thereof,  to these  questions,  and  partly  due  to internal  and
external  validity  problems  of  the  Minneapolis  Experiment,  the  National  Justice  Institute
funded  six  replication  studies  of  the  Minneapolis  Experiment,  which  produced  alarming
results  (Gelles,  1993).
The  replication  study  in  Omaha,  Nebraska,  also  utilized  a design  model  where
Page  -38-
police  utilized  mediation,  separation  or  arrest  interventions  when  responding  to  domestic
calls.  Data  were  collected  through  official  police  data  for  new  and  subsequent  arrest  and
via  victim  reported  data  through  interviews  at the  end  of  the  first  week  of  the  incident,
and  again  6 months  later.  Data  specifically  focused  on  three  forms  of  repeated  violence
including:  fear  of  injury,  pushing-hitting  and  physical  injury.  Results  indicated  that  the
arrest  of  suspects  and  the  immediate  period  of  custody  associated  with  arrest  were  not
deterrent  to  continued  violence  as comp:med  to separation,  mediation.  (Dunford,  Huizinga
&  Elliot,  1990).
The  replication  study  in  Charlotte,  North  Carolina  expanded  the  design  model  of
the  Minneapolis  Experiment  and  included  the  issuance  of  arrest  warrants  in  cases  where
suspects  were  not  present  when  police  arrived  at tlie  scene  (Dunford  et al.,  1990).  The
study  utilized  city-wide  sampling  and  employed  the  entire  patrol  division  24 hours  a day.
Data  collected  included  victim  reports  based  on interviews,  as well  as the  number  of  new
arrests  and  complaints  for  crimes  committed  as found  in  official  police  records.  Results
indicated  that  though  arrest  decreased  the  likelihood  of  continued  violence  within  the  30
days  following  an arrest,  violence  was  found  to  escalate  over  time  and  arrest  was  found  to
place  victims  in  greater  danger  of  subsequent  assaults.  Further,  results  from  official
records  and  victim  interviews  indicated  that  arrest  and  the  immediate  period  of
incarceration  were  not  deterrent  to subsequent  violence.  Suspects  that  were  not  on  the
scene  when  police  arrived  were  issued  arrest  warrants,  which  resulted  in  lower  rates  of
prevalence  and  frequency  of  repeat  offending  (Dunford  et al.,  1990).
Another  replication  study,  conducted  in  Colorado  Springs,  Colorado,  attempted  to
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contrast  arrest  vs. non-arrest  with  immediate  professional  counseling  at police
headquarters  or  the  issuance  of  an emergency  protection  order  for  victims.  Data  were
collected  via  victim  reports  from  interviews  and  new  offenses  as recorded  by  police
records.  When  the  victim  interviews  were  analyzed,  a strong  deterrent  effect  of  arrest  was
found  on subsequent  assaults.  However,  analysis  of  official  police  records  showed  arrest
had  no deterrent  effect  on  subsequent  arrests  (Berk,  Campbell,  Klap  &  Western,  1992).
The  Metro-Dade  replication  experiment  also  utilized  victim  interviews  and
official  police  records  to measure  the  deterrent  effect  of  arrest.  Victim  interviews
completed  within  weeks  of  the  incident  indicated  that  arrest  was  associated  with
reduction  in  the occurrence  of  and  subsequent  assaults  by  the same  suspect  on  the  same
victim.  Victim  interviews  conducted  6 months  after  the incident  revealed  a significant
deterrent  effect  to be attributed  to arrest.  When  analyzing  official  police  data,  arrest  was
only  marginally  short  of  significance.  Further,  the deterrent  effect  of  arrest  on subsequent
assaults,  as reported  by  officers  after  responding  to calls,  was  not  significant  (Pate  &
Hamilton,  1992).
Attempts  to replicate  the study  in  Milwaukee,  Wisconsin,  utilized  an expanded
experimental  design  which  included  three  interventions;  arrest  (11 hours  in  custody),
short  arrest  (3 hours  in  custody)  and  no arrest  (which  included  a standard  police  warning).
The  effectiveness  of  the  interventions  was  measured  from  data  collected  in victim
interviews  and  arrest  data  from  law  enforcement.  Results  indicated  that  arrest  was  not
associated  with  the  prevalence  or rate  of  future  violence.  However,  arrest  did  delay  the
average  time  until  the  next  domestic  incident.  Further,  arrest  did  interact  with
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employment  status;  the employed  were  less likely  than  the  unemployed  to recidivate.
A  second  analysis  of  the  results  of  the Milwaukee  data  provided  more
controversial  results.  Short  arrest  (3 hours)  was  found  to decrease  the chance  of  repeat
violence  and  was  a greater  deterrent  to violence  than  no arrest,  however,  over  the  long
run,  short  arrest  actually  increased  violence  rates  (Sherman,  et al., 1990).
The  Metro-Dade  Spouse  Assault  Experiment,  which  compared  the  effects  of
arrest  versus  non-arrest,  was  also  conducted  in  an effort  to replicate  the  results  of  the
Minneapolis  Experiment.  The  experiment,  conducted  from  1987  through  1989,  utilized  a
randomized  procedure  to assign  cases  involving  misdemeanor  batteries.  The  research
design  included  the following  criteria  for  arrest;  probable  cause  for  misdemeanor  spouse
battery,  no felony,  victim  and  suspect  both  on the scene  when  law  enforcement  aived,
victim  was  not  in  immediate  danger,  victim  was  a female  over  the age of  18,  officer  was
not  assaulted  by  the  suspect  or  victim  and  there  were  no outstanding  warrants,  injunctions
or criminal  protective  orders  for  victims  or suspects.  Follow-up  data  included  reports  of
victim  interview  data,  obtained  a few  days  after  the  incident,  again  at 6 months  and  new
offenses  recorded  in  police  records.  Results  indicated  that  arrest  had  a significant
deterrent  effect  among  employed  suspects,  whereas,  atest  led  to significant  increases  in
subsequent  assaults  among  unemployed  suspects.  There  were  no differences  with  respect
to marital  status  (Schmidt  &  Sherman,  1993).
The  results  of  these  experiments  reported  both  deterrent  and backfiring  effects  of
arrest  (Schmidt  &  Sherman,  1993).  One  conclusion  following  the replication  studies  was
that  arrest  does  not  necessarily  fail  to work,  but  rather,  arrest  for  the  purpose  of  deterrence
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may  not  always  work  (Buzawa  &  Buzawa,  1993).  Arrest  seemed  to deter  violence  of
employed  abusers,  but  increased  violence  for  abusers  who  were  not  employed.  Arrest  also
deterred  further  violence  with  whites  and  Hispanics,  but  did  not  deter  further  violence
among  blacks.  In  terms  of  escalating  violence,  arrest  was  found  to escalate  violence
among  Black  suspects  in  some  cities  compared  to suspects  of  other  races.  The  different
results  in  different  cities  suggest  that  arrest  has different  effects  on  various  suspects.  A
conclusion  of  the  replication  studies  is that  arrest  does  not  necessarily  fail  to work,  but
arrest  for  the  purposes  of  deterrence  may  not  always  work.  The  key  may  not  be in  the
arrest  itself,  but  the  act  of  bringing  the  offender  into  the  criminal  justice  system  regardless
of  the  means  (Buzawa,  1990).
The  only  study  conducted  in  Wisconsin  to examine  the  effectiveness  of  mandatory
arrest  policies  was  conducted  in 1989.  The  study  closely  examined  arrest  data  as well  as
data  collected  from  extensive  victim  interviews.  The  study  found  that  overall  arrest  rates
increased,  particularly  arrest  rates  for  battered  women.  Further,  arrests  were  increasingly
made  when  only  a marginal  evidence  of  probable  cause  existed  (Stafne,  1989).
The  study  concluded  that  implementation  of  the  arrest  law  resulted  in  several
unintended  hardships.  For  example,  abusive  spouses  have  reportedly  manipulated  victims
and  law  enforcement,  calling  the  police  on  the  victim  to seek  control  and  revenge.
Battered  women  reportedly  would  not  call  the  police  again  following  the  implementation
of  the  new  law.  Battered  women  indicated  fear  of  fiiture  violence  and  that  intimidation  by
the  batterers  existed  despite  the  "no-contact"  provision  (Stafne,  1989).
Victims  also  reported  economic  hardships  as the  results  of  the  numerous  domestic
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abuse  assessments,  fines  and  bonds  that  came  with  mandatory  arrest.  Further,  social  and
human  service  agencies  reported  more  temporm'y  placements  on  children,  placing  greater
demands  on  the  system.
Recommendations  included  amending  the  law  to some  degree,  taking  immediate
steps  to build  long-range  solutions,  developing  support  systems  for  victims  and  re-
educating  key  players,  such  as law  enforcement.  The  report  indicated  that  the  law  seemed
to achieve  more  in  the  accountability  (offender)  component  than  in  the  protective
component.  The  factors  previously  mentioned,  along  with  multiple  cases  of  domestic
violence  decreased  to lesser  charges,  the  report  concluded  that  the  greatest  point  of
intervention  would  be in  the  implementation  process  (Stafne,  1989).
More  recent  research  has  found  that  arrest  is an effective  intervention  in  deterring
subsequent  domestic  violence  for  18 months.  Fiuther,  when  subsequent  incidents  did
occur,  they  were  more  likely  to occur  with  men  who  had  previous  contact  with  the  police
and  were  not  arrested.  Though  subsequent  incidents  did  decrease  from  arrest,  the  number
of  subsequent  arrests  did  not  decrease  (Tolman  &  Weisz,  1995).
In  addition  to arrest  recidivism,  recent  research  also  indicates  that  arrest  may  have
a deterrent  effect  on  domestic  homicides.  Under  the  enactment  of  policy,  Quincy,  MA,
had  only  one  domestic  homicide  in 10  years.  San  Diego  reported  a 70%  decrease  in
domestic  homicides  in  the  five  years  following  implementation  of  a mandatory  arrest
policy.  Similarly,  domestic  violence  incidents  involving  serious  bodily  injury  in
Connecticut  dropped  from  600  in  1987  to 500  in  1992  (Wanless,  1996).
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CHAPTER  FOa
POLICY  GOALS  AND  OBJECTIVES
In  creating  the  mandatory  arrest  law  for  domestic  abuse,  policy  goals  addressed
the legal  and  systemic  problems  that  stood  in  the  way  of  full  application  of  such  a law
(Fagan,  1996).  The  Wisconsin  Legislature  set forth  the  intent  underlying  the  development
of  the  law:  "The  legislature  finds  that  societal  attitudes  have  been  reflected  in  policies  and
practices  of  law  enforcement  agencies,  prosecutors  and  courts.  Under  these  policies  and
practices,  the  treatment  of  a crime  may  vary  depending  on  the  relationship  between  the
criminal  offender  and  the  victim  of  the crime.  Only  recently  has public  perception  of  the
serious  consequences  of  domestic  violence  to society  and to individual  victims  led  to the
recognition  of  the  necessity  for  early  intervention  by  the  criminal  justice  system"  (1987
WI  Act  346,  p.51).
The  Legislature  also  wanted  to create  an official,  uniform  response  to cases of
domestic  violence.  The  purpose,  as set forth  by  the  Legislature  was  two-fold.  The  first,  to
recognize  domestic  abuse  as involving  serious  criminal  offenses  (1987  WI  Act  346).
Implementing  specific  and general  deterrent  threats  to reduce  the  incidence  of  domestic
violence  will  mobilize  societal  institutions  to increase  their  range  of  formal  and informal
controls  (Fagan,  1996).  Mandatory  arrest  in domestic  violence  incidents  made  physical
battering,  or threat  thereof,  in intimate  relationships,  a crime  against  the  state.  Further,  the
criminalization  of  domestic  violence  cases  was  designed  to increase  the certainty  and
severity  of  legal  responses  (Zorza,  1992).
The  second  purpose  of  mandatory  arrest  is to provide  increased  protection  for  the
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victims  of  domestic  violence  (1987  WI  Act  346).  Mandatory  arrest  forced  the  political
mobilization  of  legal  resources  and  institutions  to protect  victims  as well  as forced  the
development  of  protective  interventions  to ensure  victim  safety  and  empowerment
(Fagan,  1996).  Taking  the  perpetrators  into  custody  allows  the couple  to separate,  ensures
that  the violence  does  not  continue  or increase  in severity  and  gives  the  victim  time  to
seek  help.  Fiuther,  removing  police  discretion  takes  the  pressure  off  the  victim  to decide
whether  or not  to prosecute  and  increases  the likelihood  that  responsiveness  to victims
needs  will  be greater  (Buzawa  &  Buzawa,  1993).
The  Wisconsin  Legislature  also  set forth  four  underlying  intentions  in creating  the
mandatory  arrest  policy.  The  legislature  wanted  to create  an official  response  to cases
 of
domestic  violence  which  would,  in  turn,  stress  the enforcement  of  laws,  protect  the  victim
and  communicate  the attitude  that  violent  behavior  is neither  excused  nor  tolerated.
Secondly,  the  legislature  intended  for  criminal  laws  to be enforced  without  regard  to
 the
relationship  of  the  persons  involved.  In  addition,  a further  intent  of  the legislation  was
 for
district  attomeys  to document  the extent  of  domestic  violence  incidents  requiring  the
intervention  of  law  enforcement  agencies.  Finally,  the  legislation  specifically  included
 a
provision,  encouraging  law  enforcement  agencies  to provide  adequate  training  to officers
handling  domestic  violence.
VALUES  AND  ASSUMPTIONS
The  passage  of  mandatory  arrest  laws,  and  thus,  criminal  sanctions  for  domestic
violence,  signifies  public  intolerance  for  violence  committed  against  partners.  The  laws
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and  mobilization  of  resources  indicated  society's  rejection  of  domestic  violence  and also
communicated  a cultural  message  that  domestic  violence  was  no longer  accepted,  nor
would  it  be tolerated  (Fagan,  1996).
Humanitarian  and  women's  rights  activists  pressured  lawmakers  to  recognize  that
laws  against  assault  and  battery,  which  protected  men  from  bodily  harm  at the  hands of
other  men  should  also  apply  to  women  and  children  regardless  if  their  assailant  was  their
husband.  The  strongest  underlying  assumption  that  paved  the  path  for  the  criminalization
of  violence  against  women  is the  fundamental  right  to bodily  integrity  and  to freedom
from  intnision.  The  right  to be free  from  bodily  hartn  and  be secure  in  our  persons  is
mentioned  in  The  Bill  of  Rights,  just  as freedom  of  speech,  freedom  of  assembly  and
freedom  of  religion.  The  right  to freedom  from  bodily  harm  provides  the  moral
foundation  which  underlies  our  laws  against  physical  assault  (Jones,  1994).
As  civil  and  class-action  suits  were  filed  for  and  on  behalf  of  victims  of  domestic
violence,  two  ISSUES were  challenged.  First,  the  historical  "family  ideals"  value  holds  that
family  matters  are  private,  rather  than  public  matters  of  the  state  (Pleck,  1987).  In
essence,  the  legal  concept  of  privacy  was  challenged.  Domestic  violence  came  to be seen
as a public,  not  private  matter.
Second,  constitutional  rights  to due  process  and  equal  protection  of  the  law  were
challenged.  The  equal  protection  clause  of  the 14'  Amendment  states  that  no  person  shall
be deprived  of  life,  liberty  or  property  without  the  due  process  of  the  law.  Historically,
due  process,  similar  to  the  equal  protection  provision,  was  designed  to protect  men  from
the  state  and  those  who  act  for  the  state  from  each  other.  This  clause  became  a significant
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argument  in  many  suits  filed  against  police  departments.  Victims  argued  that  police
departments'  failure  to protect  them  was  a direct  violation  of  their  due  process  and  equal
protection  rights.  The  courts  ruled,  however,  that  when  the state  invites  or  even  directs
citizens  to depend  upon  agencies,  such  as law  enforcement,  for  help  or  protection,  they
have  already  intervened  in  their  lives.  The  courts  ruled  that  it is the state's duty to take
reasonable  measures  to protect  individuals  from  other  individuals  regardless  of  their
relationship.  Thus,  battering  came  to be defined  as a violation  of  civil  and  human  rights.
Today,  our  society  assumes  that  it  is the  task  of  government  to keep  peace  among  its
citizens,  keep  them  safe  from  the  state  itself,  from  enemies  abroad  and  from  one another
so that  all  can  exercise  freedom  and  pursue  happiness  (Jones,  1994).
Another  shift  which  affected  the  development  and enactment  of  domestic  abuse
laws  was  the fundamental  sift  away  from  the  traditional  privilege  of  patriarchy.
Specifically,  as social  reform  focused  on the prevention  of  child  abuse,  the  best  interests
of  the child  took  the  forefront.  While  historically,  the law  assumed  that  decisions
regarding  an individual's  best  interest  were  always  the  same  as what  was  felt  to be in  the
family's  best  interest,  today,  it  is clear  that  a woman's  duty  to her  child  should  take
precedence  over  her  duty  to her  husband  (Jones,  1994).  As  research  and  knowledge
accumulated  that  illustrated  the  negative  impact  of  domestic  violence  on children,  the
widespread  belief  shifted  that  living  with  brutality  was  no longer  the wife's  duty  (Jones,
1994).
The  underlying  assixmptions  of  the reforms  that  led  to mandatory  arrest  policies
were  that  family  violence  could  be stopped  through  legal  sanctions  and  that  legal
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sanctions  were  effective  in  decreasing  violence  (Fagan,  1996).  The  reforms  were  aimed  at
specific  measures  to stop  the  violence,  mainly  arrest.  Further,  the  assumption  that
administratively  removing  officer  discretion  would  actually  lead  to a change  in  officer's
behaviors  on the streets,  thus  a change  in street  level  violence  (Buzawa  &  Buzawa,  1996).
Proponents  of  mandatory  arrest  suggest  that  officers  either  do not  have  adequate
knowledge  on  handling  domestic  abuse  cases or actively  disapprove  of  police
interventions  in  such  cases.  It  is assumed  that  the  normal,  proper  use of  discretion
requires  that  officers  act on his  or  her  values  and experience  to make  rapid  interpretation
of  ambiguous  facts,  determine  legal  requirements  and  analyze  possible  consequences  of
actions.  Implementing  arrest  policies  tries  to force  change  in  behavior  without  necessarily
changing  officer  attitudes.  Attitudinal  changes,  then,  would  occur  at some  later  point  by
training  officers  on the rationale  of  the  policy  and  by  conversion  due  to their  immersion
into  the  procedures  (Buzawa  &  Buzawa,  1996).  Therefore,  the  use of  discretion  itself,  not




ASSESSMENT  AND  ANAI,YSIS
Arrest,  by  far,  is the  most  prevalent  form  of  legal  control  in  the  United  States,
with  14 million  arrests  made  each  year  (FBI,  1989).  It  was  anticipated  that  the enactment
of  mandatory  arrest  policies  would  generate  a deterrent  effect  once  it  became  public
knowledge  that  law  enforcement  took  batterers  to  jail  (Jolin  &  Moose,  1997).  AS
mandatory  arrest  policies  were  implemented  across  the  United  States,  arrests  for  minor
assaults  increased  70%  from  1984  to 1989  (Schmidt  &  Sherman,  1993).  Despite  the
staggering  increase,  the  efficacy  of  police  response  and  arrest  as an intervention  is still
inconclusive.
One  problem  in  determining  the  effect  mandatory  arrest  policies  have  had  on
domestic  violence  rates  is that  a change  in  police  practices  and attitudes  must  occur
following  the enactment  of  the  policies.  The  assumption  was  that  attitudinal  change
would  occur  with  law  enforcement  following  training  and  their  immersion  into  the
procedure.  However,  results  are inconclusive.  It is still  unclear  whether  police
departments  are supportive  of  mandatory  arrest  policies  and studies  have  not  confirmed
that  long-term  changes  in  police  practices  have  occurred  (Buzawa  &  Buzawa,  1996).
Further,  law  enforcement  training  has been  sporadic  and  inconsistent  across  departments.
In some  departments,  no training  occurred  and  officers  were  virtually  unaware  of  new
laws  (Buzawa  &  Buzawa,  1990).  Thus,  the  mandated  training  provision  in  mandatory
arrest  legislation,  though  sound  in  intent,  has failed  at the  implementation  stage.  It  has
been  suggested  that  even  in 1994,  the underlying  assumption  of  law  enforcement  may  be
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that  making  arrests  in  domestic  disputes  is ineffective  and  counterproductive  (Buzawa  &
Buzawa,  1996).
Mandatory  arrest  policies  intended  to remove  officer  discretion  in arrests  for
domestic  violence,  partially  in  an effort  to create  an official,  uniform  response  to
domestic  violence  cases. However,  an inconsistency  that  has been  found  in  police
departments  following  the enactment  of  mandatory  arrest  policies  is the officers'  failure
to find  reasonable  and  probable  grounds  to arrest  (Buzawa  &  Buzawa,  1996).  One  study,
following  implementation  of  a policy  that  expanded  officer's  ability  to make  wanantless
arrests,  reported  a 2500%  increase  in  the  number  of  arrests.  Though  an increase  in  the
number  of  arrests  was  expected  to occur,  those  arrested  only  accounted  for  9o/o of  the  total
domestic  violence  calls  received.  The  difference  between  the enactment  of  the  policy  and
the  perceived  arrests  was  attributed  to the increased  tendency  of  officers  to find
"reasonable  and  probable  grounds"  for  an arrest  (Jaffe,  Wolfe,  Telford  &  Austin,  1986).
This  is also  illustrated  by  a study  conducted  with  the Minneapolis  Police
Department,  a supporter  of  the  use of  arrests.  The  department  acknowledged  that  in 1986,
despite  its  mandatory  arrest  policy,  only  3,645  arrests  were  made  out  of  24,948  total
domestic  calls.  According  to police,  in 60oA of  these  incidents,  the  officer  disposed  of  the
case through  talk  or  mediation.  Still,  in  other  cases,  officers  responded,  but  failed  to file
the  report  required  by  the agency  (Balos  &  Trotzky,  1988).
Inconsistencies  in finding  probable  and  reasonable  grounds  to make  arrests  in
domestic  violence  cases  suggests  that  the intentions  of  mandatory  arrest  policies  are being
undermined  by  officer  interpretation  of  legal  definitions.  This  misinterpretation  directly
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affects  arrest  rates  and  victim  safety,  but  may  also  be indicative  of  a much greater
implementation  flaw;  that  domestic  violence  is still  not  being  recognized  consistently  by
law  enforcement  as a serious  criminal  offense.  This,  in  turn,  does  not  allow  the  message
to be conveyed  that  violent  behavior  is neither  excused  nor  tolerated.  Due  to the
confusion  of  and inconsistency  surroiuiding  the  legal  definitions  of  probable  and
reasonable  grounds  to arrest  as set forth  by  mandatory  arrest  policies,  it may  also  be
suggested  that  the  training  provisions  set forth  by  the  legislation  have  not  been  met.
Though  mandatory  arrest  policies  have  removed  discretion  as an arrest  factor,  it
may  still  be used  in individual  officer's  decisions  in interpreting  legal  definitions  of
reasonable  and  probable  grounds.  This  has led  to less consistency  and  predictability  in
officers  actions  and across  jurisdictions,  in  contrast  to the  past  when  inaction  and  apathy
were  the  widely  shared  norms.  Thus,  mandatory  arrest  policies  are placing  far  more
power  in  the  hands  of  police  departments,  which  have  historically  been  unresponsive  and
unsympathetic  to the  needs  of  battered  women  (Buzawa  &  Buzawa,  1996).
While  it would  appear  that  the  policy  is being  enforced  in  regard  to the
relationship  between  the  persons  involved,  another  outcome  of  inconsistent  police
discretion  that  occurred  following  the  implementation  of  mandatory  arrest  policies  was  an
increase  in  the  number  of  dual  arrests,  where  both  parties  are arrested.  A  survey  done  in
Wisconsin  indicated  that  13%  of  the  victims  were  arrested  the  year  of  the policy  was
enacted  (Stafne,  1989).  Other  studies  reported  similar  rates:  11%  in  Oregon,  18.8%  in
Connecticut  (Victim  Services  Agency,  1988)  and 13%  in  the first  year  of  implementation
with  an increase  to 25%  in  the  following  year.  Other  estimates  indicate  that  1/3 of  all
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arrests  following  the implementation  of  mandatory  arrest  policies  were  dual  arrests  and
that  in  as much  as 50%  of  the  cases  where  arrests  were  made,  the  woman  was  charged
(Victim  Services  Agency,  1988).  Research  that  examined  dual  arrests  in  another  program
clearly  illustrated  that  almost  all  of  the  women  that  were  arrested  for  domestic  violence
actually  committed  the  acts in self-defense  (Hamberger  &  Amold,  1990).
In  response  to such  numbers,  legislatures  moved  to eradicate  the  misinterpretation
of  the statute  by  adding  a primary  physical  aggressor  provision,  which  provides
considerations  for  officers  to take  into  account  when  determining  who  the  "pary
physical  aggressor"  was.  Though  the added  definitions  helped  to decrease  the incidence
of  dual  arrests,  it  in  turn,  reintroduced  the  element  of  police  discretion  that  the  state  first
attempted  to eliminate  (Buzawa  &  Buzawa,  1996).
Mandatory  arrest  policies  have  also  put  increased  pressure  on law  enforcement
agencies  to make  increasing  referrals  and  linkages  to social  service  agencies  in cases of
domestic  violence,  which  they  are not  asked  to make  in other  types  of  crimes  (Fagan,
1996).  This,  along  with  domestic  violence  cases competing  with  other  patrol  priorities  for
immediate  attention,  may  lead  to role  and  policy  ambiguity,  which  may  undermine  law
enforcement's  ability  in  pursuing  either  the  victim's  protection  or sanctioning  the
offender.  Thus,  domestic  violence  cases,  especially  those  of  low  or no injiuy  will  not
receive  the  highest  priority  compared  to other  incidents  (Fagan,  1996).
Historically,  "case  screening"  has been  a criticism  of  law  enforcement  in  relation
to domestic  violence.  Researchers  agree  that  only  a minority  of  domestic  assaults  among
intimates  resulted  in  the  dispatch  of  police  officers.  Cases  were  excluded  through
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dispatcher  call  screening  and  call  prioritization,  thus  many  calls  involving  a felony  were
re-categorized  as minor  family  trouble  calls  (Buzawa  &  Buzawa,  1993).  The
implementation  of  mandatory  arrest  laws  theoretically  should  have  eliminated  case
screening.  All  cases  of  domestic  violence  should  be recognized  as a serious  criminal
offenses  and  the  message  that  violence  is neither  excused,  nor  tolerated  should  be
communicated.  However,  research  still  indicates  that  case screening  is still  occurring
(Buzawa  &  Buzawa,  1996).  One  study  found  that  police  did  not  even  respond  to domestic
calls  in 12%  of  reported  cases (Balos  &  Trotsky,  1988).
Theoretically,  mandatory  arrest  policies  are based  on the  premise  that  arrest
penalties,  occurring  swiftly,  will  deter  domestic  violence.  Thus,  the  enactment  of  such
policies  was  also  believed  to increase  the likelihood  of  prosecution  of  offenders  (Buzawa
&  Buzawa,  1996).  Historically,  prosecutors  were  accused  of  disinterest  in  family
violence,  similar  to that  of  law  enforcement.  Criticisms  of  prosecutorial  actions  include
the failure  to file  charges  or aggressively  pursue  convictions  and sanctions  against
perpetrators  (Fields,  1978;  Lerman,  1986;  Martin,  1976).  Further,  the  high  dismissal  rates
have  been  suggested  to give  police  further  incentives  to not  make  arrests  (Elliot,  1988).
One  of  the consequences  of  the low  prosecution  rates  has been  an increase  in
reluctance  on  the  part  of  law  enforcement  to arrest  perpetrators  due  to the belief  that  the
amount  of  work  invested  in  making  an arrest  would  not  lead  to further  legal  action
(Dutton,  1987;  Ferraro  &  Pope,  1993).  Low  prosecution  rates  not  only  undermine
deterrence  by  neutralizing  the actions  of  police,  but  also  decrease  the likelihood  of  legal
sanctions  following  arrest  (Fagan,  1996),  which  is one  of  the  primary  goals  of  mandatory
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arrest  policies.  This,  in  tum,  has a profound  effect  on  victims,  who  view  the  police  and
prosecutors  as unwilling  to protect  them.  Victims  fear  pressing  charges  will  only  increase
the  batterers's  rage  (Ferraro  &  Boychuck,  1992;  Jaffe,  Hastings,  Reitzel  &  Austin,  1993).
Consequently,  all  parties  reinforce  each  other's  inaction  (Tolman,  1995).  This  further
raises  the question  of  whether  the  trauma  to the  victim  caused  by  the  drawn-out  process
of  prosecution  is worth  the  effort,  especially  given  the low  success  rate  of  prosecution
(Herzberger,  1996).
Prior  to mandatory  arrest  policies,  prosecution  of  offenders  was  often  dependent
upon  the  victim's  willingness  to press  charges.  However,  states  have  a clear  obligation  to
prosecute  domestic  violence  cases  regardless  of  the  victim's  wishes  and  are clearly
compelled  to prosecute  potentially  dangerous  offenders  in the interest  of  public  safety
(Friedman  & Schulman,  1990).  However,  prosecution  rates  are low,  occurring  in  less than
10%  of  misdemeanor  cases (Ford,  1993).  Further,  the  rates  for  convictions  and sentencing
are even  less (Dutton,  1995).  Such  rates  suggest  that  the  most  substantive  sanctions,  in
most  cases,  remain  the  process  of  arrest  (Fagan,  1996),  however,  arrest  may  have  moved
the element  of  discretion  from  the  time  of  arrest  to the  point  of  prosecutorial  screening
(Davis  &  Smith,  1995).
In  Wisconsin,  as in  many  other  states,  district  attorney's  offices  throughout  the
state  are required  to submit  annual  reports  to the State  Department  of  Justice  indicating
the number  of  arrests  made  each  year.  In Wisconsin,  the data  indicate  the  relationship  of
the  victim  and  offender,  if  a weapon  was  used,  as well  as charging  and  dispositional
statistics.  However,  the  data  does  not  delineate  if  arrest  was  "effective"  in deterring
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further  episodes  of  domestic  violence,  nor  does  it take  into  account  factors  that influence
the  fluctuations  in  arrest  rates.  While  the  data  may  be useful  in  tracking  the  prevalence  of
domestic  violence  cases  requiring  police  intervention,  as well  as the  niunber  of  cases
prosecuted  each  year,  the  data  provide  little  insight  into  the  effectiveness  of  interventions
currently  in  place  in  regards  to deterrency  or  recidivism  (Office  of  Crime  Victims
Services,  1996).
Not  only  is the  prosecution  of  family  cases  rarely  successful  (Herzberger,  1996);
prosecution  of  non-family  assaults  often  fails  (Elliot,  1989).  It  is theorized  that  offenders
have  discovered  that  the  penalties  for  domestic  violence  are small.  Though  arrest  may
have  an independent  effect  in  decreasing  the  likelihood  of  further  violence,  ultimately  the
responsibility  for  ensuring  and  imposing  sanctions  falls  upon  the  prosecution  and
judiciary  (Herzberger,  1996).
The  City  of  Milwaukee  utilized  a policy  that  required  victims  be present  for  a
charging  conference  held  the  day  after  the  arrest.  Prosecution  of  cases  was  dependent
upon  their  presence.  Only  20o/o of  the  cases  were  actually  prosecuted  under  the  policy.
The  other  80%  were  screened  out.  When  the  policy  was  dropped  in  January  of  1995,  and
victims  were  no longer  required  to attend  the  charging  conference,  the  rate  of  accepting
cases  for  prosecution  increased  from  20%  to 60  percent  (Davis,  1995).
One  study,  based  on  victim  reports,  showed  that  any  type  of  prosecutorial  action
lowered  the  risk  of  recurring  violence  50%  within  6 months  of  case  settlement  when
compared  to  the  level  of  pre-prosecution  violence  (Ford  &  Regoli,  1992).  However,  the
most  comprehensive  prosecution  shidy,  the  Indianapolis  Domestic  Violence  Prosecution
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Experiment,  showed  no significant  protective  effects  from  prosecution.  Results  did
indicate  a significant  reduction  in  "severe"  violence  when  the  victim  initiated
prosecutorial  actions  as compared  to  the  traditional  summons  and  prosecution  procedure
(Ford,  1993).  Many  counties  are  developing  special  prosecution  units  which  focus  on  the
prosecution  of  domestic  violence  cases.  However,  despite  the  development  of  these  units,
few  studies  have  documented  the  effects  of  prosecution  on  the  control  and/or
reoccurrence  of  spousal  assault  (Fagan,  1996).
One  of  the  trends  occurring  in  this  area  is the  addition  of  "no-drop"  policies  by
prosecutors.  Critics  of  no-drop  policies  suggest  that  they  provide  fiirther  disincentives  for
women  to interact  with  the  legal  system,  based  on  potential  conflict  between  the  victim's
goals  and  the  goals  of  prosecution  (Fagan,  1996).  Proponents  argue  that  no-drop  policies
remove  the  responsibility  from  the  victim,  thus  making  them  less  likely  to be targeted  for
intimidation  attempts  from  the  offender.  Prosecutors  who  remove  the  responsibility  from
victims  are seeing  increased  victim  cooperation  and  higher  conviction  rates  (Hoctor,
1997).  Further,  few  studies  have  documented  the  effects  of  prosecution  on  the  control  or
reoccurrence  of  assault.  Men  with  prior  arrest  records  or  who  had  a lengthy  history  of
severe  violence  were  more  likely  to  reoffend  if  prosecuted,  compared  with  men  not
prosecuted  (Fagan,1989;  Sherman  et al., 1991).
One  study  that  investigated  conviction  rates  following  the  implementation  of
mandatory  sentencing  found  that  the  percentage  of  cases  dismissed  or  acquitted  more  than
doubled.  Further,  convictions  became  more  difficult  and  it  was  found  that  mandatory
penalties  decreased  the  incentive  for  defendants  to plead  guilty.  A  smaller  percentage  of
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those  charged  received  a penalty  than  in the  previous  year  before  the  enactment  of  the
mandatory  penalties  (Carlson  &  Nidey,  1995).  Although  some  level  of  sanctioning  may
result  from  arrest  alone,  deterrence  ultimately  results  from  the  actions  of  the  prosecution
and  judiciary,  whose  actions  ultimately  lead  to substantive  punishment.
Mandatory  arrest  policies  send  a strong  message  to the  victim,  the  perpetrator  and
to society  that  domestic  violence  is a crime  and  that  batterers  will  be held  accountable  for
their  actions.  Further,  such  policies  help  to dispel  the  myths  that  domestic  violence  is
rare,  aberrant  behavior  (Eisenberg  &  Moriarty,  1991).  Mandatory  arrest  has had  many
positive  effects  on  victims  of  domestic  violence.  Arrest  conveys  the  message  to victims
that  someone  cares  and  that  the  police  will  respond  to their  calls  for  help,  which  may
empower  victims.  It  is further  suggested  that  calling  the  police  is one of  the first  steps  that
victims  take  toward  ending  the  abuse  (Wanless,  1996).  Police  interventions  also  have
been  suggested  to help  victims  develop  the courage  to leave  an abusive  situation  or seek
further  help  (Herzberger,  1996).  Further,  should  the  abuse  continue  following  an arrest,
victims  may  come  to recognize  that  violence  is deep  rooted  and  thereby,  give  up hope  for
change  in  the  relationship  (Herzberger,  1996).
Arrest  is theorized  to intemipt  the expected  escalation  of  violence  (Hoctor,  1997),
thus  protects  the victim  by  assuring  that  the  immediate  violence  will  stop  (Eigenberg  &
Moriarty,  1991).  Further,  victim  safety  is enhanced  if  batterers  are held  long  enough  to
allow  the  victim  to seek  shelter  (Goolkasian,  1986;  Schecter,  1982).  The  separation  also
provides  the opportunity  for  victims  to consider,  in safety  and  non-threatening
circumstances,  their  situation  and  make  decisions  about  their  future  (Wanless,  1996).
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Mandatory  arrest  policies  have  also  had  negative,  unintended  consequences  for
victims  of  domestic  violence.  First,  the  enactment  of  such  policies  removed  the decision
for  arrest  firom  the  victim's  control  (Wanless,  1996).  By  reporting  the abuse,  the  victim
may  sense a loss  of  control  in  the  legal  process  (Buzawa  &  Buzawa,  1990),  which  further
erodes  at the already  suffering  self-esteem  of  victims  by  contributing  to a sense  of
helplessness  from  t.he loss  of  control.  Though  victims  may  want  the abuse  to stop,  they
lose  control  over  the  ensuing  process  once  arrest  is made.  Further,  once  a woman  realizes
that  she loses  control  over  the  arrest  outcome,  she may  be deterred  from  calling  the  police
in  future  incidents  (Buzawa,  1982).
Policies  have  also  had  the  unintended  effect  of  decreasing  the  number  of  calls
received  by  law  enforcement  for  assistance.  One  study,  following  the enactment  of  more
aggressive  arrest  policies,  received  fewer  calls  for  assistance  than  before  the  policy  was
enacted.  Evidence  available  did  not  indicate  that  the actual  rate  of  domestic  violence
decreased,  but  rather,  that  victims  were  no longer  calling  the  police  for  assistance.  Yet
other  departments  report  an increase  in  the  number  of  calls.  Wisconsin,  for  example,
received  27,942  calls  reporting  domestic  violence  in  the first  year  of  implementation.  The
following  year,  32,200  calls  were  reported  (Office  of  Crime  Victim  Services,  1994).
Because  violence  between  intimates  has been  shown  to increase  over  time  (Giles-Sims,
1983;  Pagelow,  1984;  Straus,  1986),  unreported  incidents  not  only  eliminate  the
opportunity  of  offenders  receiving  formal  sanctions,  but  also  places  women  at an
increased  risk  of  sustaining  injuries  (Pagelow,  1984).
The  temporary  separation  while  the offender  is incarcerated  and  throughout  the
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no-contact  period  may  cause  a financial  loss  to victims  who  are often  financially
dependent  on  their  partners.  Opponents  of  mandatory  arrest  suggest  that  such  policies
force  battered  women  to choose  between  ending  the  abuse  and  having  food  and  shelter
(Wanless,  1996).
In  addition,  mandatory  arrest  policies  have  been  attributed  to increasing  costs  for
the  criminal  justice  system.  Agencies  have  had  to budget  for  additional  officers,  jails,
prosecutors,  public  defenders  and  court  services.  Further,  it  has been  suggested  that
mandatory  arrest  policies  may  cause  overcrowding  of  jails.  Though  costs  may  initially
rise,  if  arrest  does  produce  a deterrent  effect,  domestic  abuse  calls  and  cases  should  drop
as recidivism  rates  decrease,  ultimately  resulting  in  cost  savings  (Wanless,  1996).
Community  policing  has become  the  trend  in  law  enforcement  interventions  of  the
90's  (Rosenbaurn  &  Lurigio,  1994)  and  has been  shown  to be effective  in deterring
domestic  violence.  Cornmiu'iity  policing  has been  regarded  by  its supporters  as the "only
fomi  of  policing  available  for  anyone  who  seeks  to improve  police  operations,
management,  or  relations  with  the  public  (Eck  &  Rosenbaurn,  1994,  p.4).
The  concept  of  community  policing  is more  proactive  based  on  police-citizen
partnerships  that  attempt  to solve  problems  before  they  evolve  into  serious  incidents
(Skolnick  &  Baylety,  1986).  In  this  holistic  approach,  the  usual  focus  on making  atests  is
replaced  by attempts  to mobilize  relevant  agencies  to solve  cornrnunity  problems,  thus,
public  involvement  defines  priorities,  as well  as appropriate  responses.  The  strongest
component  of  cornrnunity  policing  surrounds  strategies  to facilitate  changes,  including  the
creation  and  improvement  of  policies,  the  debureaucratization  of  police  departments  aiia
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the  integration  of  current  management  techiques  (Buzawa  & Buzawa,  1996).
A  dual  emphasis  is placed  on the  importance  of  direct  interactions  with  citizens  as
well  as utilizing  flexible  responses  to neighborhood  crime  (Davis  &  Taylor,  1997).  It
involves  fiill-time,  long  term  assignments  (Greene  &  Taylor,  1988),  places  officers  back
on  the  streets  (Greene  &  McLaughlin,  1993)  and  increases  foot  patrol  in  highly  populated
areas  (Buzawa  &  Buzawa,  1996).
Though  community  policing  appears  to have  many  positive  benefits,  as well  as
substantial  potential,  this  approach  also  has unintended  consequences  on  domestic
violence.  First,  the  theoretical  concept  of  community  policing  again  focuses  police  efforts
on  crimes  of  public  disorder,  at the  expense  of  crimes  of  private  disorder,  such  as family
violence  (Buzawa  &  Buzawa,  1996).  Further,  the  focus  on attempts  to mobilize  relevant
agencies  to solve  problems,  rather  than  arrest,  does  not  ensure  legal  sanctions  in  cases  of
domestic  violence,  nor  does  it  promote  victim  safety.  Further,  though  many  of  the current
community  policing  programs  have  been  funded  through  additional  monies  made
available  tmough  the 1994  U.S.  Crime  Bill,  concerns  have  been  noted  that  the  increase  in
officer  foot  patrol  may  detract  from  police  ability  to respond  rapidly  to victim  calls  for
assistance.  Upon  loss  of  additional  funding,  the  additional  positions  needed  to implement
cornrnunity  policing  programs  will  fall  back  on individual  departments.  It  is feared  that
departments  will  be forced  to cut  administrative  and  support  services,  or would  be forced
to fund  the  positions  firom  other  patrol  operations  (Buzawa  &  Buzawa,  1996).
Another  concern  noted  surrounding  community  policing  practices  is the  diversion
of  911 calls  to other  sources.  In some  areas,  billboards  display  suggestions  of  alternative
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places  people  can  call  for  assistance,  rather  than  calling  Emergency  911.  The  concem  is
that  victims  that  are most  likely  to call  may  be those  already  hesitant  to request  assistance
for  fear  their  request  will  be minimized  (Buzawa  &  Buzawa,  1996).  Thus,  though
community  policing  has numerous  benefits  as well  as consequences,  research  is needed
that  focuses  specifically  on  the  impact  that  problem  solving,  as opposed  to arrest,  crime  in
public  places  and  the  diversion  of  calls  will  have  on  domestic  violence  victims.
Current  data  suggest  that  system  level  interventions  often  called  community
intervention  projects  or coordinated  community  interventions  (CCI's)  are effective  in
deterring  domestic  violence.  These  projects,  initiated  by  the  battered  women's  movement,
have  the long-range  goal  of  eliminating  violence  against  women.  The  projects  are based
on the  belief  that  battering  is only  one set of  tactics  that  men  employ  to control  women.
Interventions  address  cultural  and  social  stnucture  supports  for  battering  within
interpersonal,  family  and  societal  contexts  (Tiffl,  1993).  The  primary  strategy  of  the
intervention  projects  is to establish  and  maintain  shelters  and  programs  for  battered
women  and  their  children.  Interventions  include:  offering  women  a safe  refuge  from
physical  violence  and  encouraging  women  to examine  life  choices  and  promote  self-
definition,  asserting  the  rights  of  individual  battered  women  and  promoting  changes  in
criminal  justice,  legislative  and social  service  policies  in  order  to ensure  the  needs  of
battered  women  are met.  Altemg  the  official  response  to domestic  violence  also
encourages  other  members  of  the  community  to counter  the  core  cultural  and  societal
structure  supports  for  battering  (Pence,  1989).
Another  strategy  of  coordinated  community  interventions  is to hold  men
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accountable  for  their  use of  violence,  which  is accomplished  by  pressuring  judicial  actors
to respond  to domestic  violence  as a crime  rather  than  a domestic  conflict.  They  strive  to
alter  the  official  public  response  toward  domestic  violence  and  counteract  legal  support  of
battering  (Pence,  1989;  Pence  &  Shepard,  1988).
One  study,  which  examined  3 small  communities  with  CCI's  in  place,  found  that
the  intervention  projects  significantly  increased  arrest  rates  and  convictions,  as well  as
court  mandates  to treatment.  The  data  fumer  indicated  that  larger  systems  experience
more  difficulty  coordinating  these  interventions  than  small  systems.  The  data,  did  not,
however,  indicate  the  extent  to which  violence  against  women  was  reduced  (Gamache  et
al., 1988).
An  evaluation  of  a CCI  in  Nebraska  found  that  post  arrest  sanctions  had  little
influence  on  recidivism  beyond  the effects  achieved  through  the  initial  arrest.  Data
suggested  that  certain  post  arrest  sanctions  might  be associated  with  lower  rates  of
recidivism  (Steinman,  1988).  A  second  study  was  conductedtwo  years  later  to further
investigate  post  arrest  sanctions.  Cases  were  compared  before  and  after  the
implementation  of  a CCI.  Results  indicated  that  police  actions  alone,  not  coordinated
with  other  sanctions,  actually  led  to an increase  in  violence  (Steinman,  1990).  Other
research  has suggested  that  police  visits  to the home,  combined  with  eventual  arrest  of  the
perpetrator,  followed  by  court  mandated  treatment,  was  more  likely  than  other
combinations  of  criminal  justice  actions  to end repeat  incidents  of  violence  (Syers  &
Edleson,  1992).
Comprehensive  CCI's  have  been  developed  in  Wisconsin,  Minnesota,  Colorado,
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California  and Washington.  The  Duluth  Domestic  Abuse  Intervention  Project  (D.A.I.P.),
based  on  an individual  model  of  violence,  recognizes  domestic  violence  as an individual
response  to a social  problem.  The  educational  program  assumes  that  the  belief  system
underlying  battering  behavior  is leamed  in  our  culhire  in  families  of  origin.  Rather  than
focusing  on individual  personality  attributes  of  the  batterers,  the  program  is structured  on
empowering  batterers  to understand  their  patterns  of  abuse.  An  assessment  of  the  program
indicated  that  6 months  after  the  perpetrators  had  completed  their  involvement  in  the
city's  program,  which  included  court-mandated  education  classes  and  group  counseling,
victims  reported  no subsequent  violence  (Pence  &  Shepard,  1988).
Another  study,  based  on  the  program  model  of  domestic  violence  intervention
projects,  worked  directly  with  households  to reduce  the  risk  of  future  crime.  Response
teams  include  a police  officer  and  a social  worker  dispatched  to domestic  complaints.
This  particular  model  is based  on  research  in  the  United  States  that  shows  that  those
individuals  that  are victimized  are at an increased  risk  for  repeat  victimization.  The
objectives  of  such  interventions  include  increasing  confidence  in  victims  of  domestic
violence  in  law  enforcement  so they  will  call  the  police  more  readily  when  violence
occurs,  then  linking  victims  to services.  The  long  term  goal  of  the  projects  is to reduce
family  violence.
One  study  examined  the  effectiveness  of  such  a project.  Response  teams  included
a police  officer  and  social  worker,  randomly  assigned  to households  reporting  domestic
violence  within  two  public  housing  police  services  areas in  New  York.  The  residences
that  received  the  follow-up  visit  were  provided  with  public  education  information  on
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domestic  violence  as well  as information  on  arresting  the  offender.  Results indicated  that
victims  from  households  with  prior  police  contacts  experienced  the  most serious
violence.  Victims  who  received  the  home  visit  intervention  called  the  police  more
frequently,  as did  those  victims  who  received  public  education.  It  was  found  that  the
victims  were  at an increased  risk  level  especially  high  within  11 days  following  the
incident  (Lloyd  et al., 1994).  Households  that  were  assigned  to receive  a home  visit  were
more  likely  to report  new  violence  to the  police  sooner  than  those  who  did not  receive  the
home  visit  intervention.  Victims  with  prior  police  involvement  were  more  likely  to use
the  services  than  those  who  did  not  have  a history  of  police  involvement.  Further,  92%  of
the  victims  reported  that  they  found  the  information  on  arresting  the  perpetrator  useful
(Davis  &  Taylor,  1997).
Some  states  have  recently  begun  to experiment  with  community  intervention
projects  svhere  victim  advocates  work  with  law  enforcement  officials.  In  this  case,
advocates  offer  support  and  information  to victims  and  encourage  the  pursuit  of  legal
remedies  (Steinman,  1990).  Yet  other  states  have  combined  law  enforcement
interventions  with  a social  work  perspective.  Here  again,  advocates  offer  support,  provide
information  to victims  at the  legal  system  and  provide  referrals  to community  services
(Weisz  et al., 1995).
Given  the  dual  emphasis  of  CCI's,  ensuring  victim  safety  and  promoting
perpetrator  accountability,  at current  time,  they  seem  to be the  most  effective  intervention
to promote  coexisting  policy  goals  of  mandatory  arrest  policies  and  may  provide  the
means  to implement  the  goals  at an operational  level.  Further,  CCI's  may  invoke  the
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informal  social  controls  in  which  legal  sanctions  play  an indirect  role,  which  law
enforcement  cannot  solely  due  because  they  are not  trained  for  such  and  also  because the
roles  would  be contradictory.
Studies  on  batterers  treatment  indicates  that  many  batterers  have  conditions  such
as impaired  cognition  and  mental  disorder  (Dutton,  1995).  The  logic  of  deterrence  is
compromised  among  batterers  whose  behavior  is patterned  over  time.  Among  violent
men  whose  behaviors  are increasingly  spiraling  out of  control,  the threat of  punishment
may  be remote  and  inconsequential,  under  conditions  of  arousal  and  cognitive  distortion.
CCI's  may  allow  for  an approach  that  could  better  address  the  different  factors  of
domestic  violence,  such  as individual  pathology,  but  also  such  factors  as cultural  biases,
socio  economic  factors,  etc.
Efforts  to deter  domestic  violence  have  fallen  predominantly  on law  enforcement,
however,  there  is little  research  that  has demonstrated  that  mandatory  arrest  has had  its
intended  effects  (Buzawa  &  Buzawa,  1996).  Research  has suggested  that  arrest  may  have
short-term  deterrent  effects  in  different  subgroups  of  batterers,  depending  on the  nature  of
the crime,  the size  of  the city  and  individual  characteristics,  such  as marital  and
employment  status  (Fagan,  1996:  Pate  &  Hamilton,  1 992;  Sherman  et al., 1 992);
however,  these  effects  may  decay  over  time  (Sherman,  1992).  Few  studies  have  analyzed
the  effects  of  legal  sanctions  within  a framework  on  increasing  severity  of  violence
(Fagan,  1996).
Although  research  indicates  that  the  most  potent  police  visit  to the  home  may  be
the  first  (Fagan,  1989),  other  research  indicates  that  the  threat  of  arrest  may  be a relatively
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weak  sanction  (Carmody  &  Williarns,  1987).  There  is little  evidence  of  the  long-term
effects  of  non-arrest  on domestic  violence  (Elliot,  1989).  Although  arrest  numbers  have
increased,  the  sanctions  in  most  cases simply  remains  the  process  of  arrest  (Fagan,  1996).
Without  prosecution  and  penalties,  deterrence  may  not  occur  at all.
One  of  the  difficulties  in  assessing  the effectiveness  of  mandatory  arrest  policies
are the  competing  goals  of  mandatory  atrest  policies,  mainly,  punishing  offenders  and
protecting  victims.  Attempts  to evaluate  policy  efficacy  are met  with  weighing  potential
risks  as well  as trade-offs  of  punitive  measures  versus  victim  autonomy.  At  best,  the
competing  goals  may  not  necessarily  be compatible.  Fiuther,  this  role  ambiguity  affects
the  performance  of  agencies,  particularly  in  respect  to their  missions,  ultimately
undermining  the  effectiveness  of  pursuit  of  either  goal  (Fagan,  1996).
In  addition,  attention  to the issue  of  domestic  violence  is often  in  direct
competition  with  other  crimes,  such  as homicide,  which  often  are viewed  as more  severe.
Factoring  in  the  existence  of  limited  resources  and  scarcity  of  funding,  the  result  is not
necessarily  a weak  policy,  but  rather,  the  weak  implementation  of  a policy.  The  resulting




Despite  the  inconclusive  research  on  the  deterrent  effects  of  domestic  violence  on
fiuther  episodes  of  violence,  returning  to previous  police  practices  and  policies,  such  as
non  arrest,  should  be met  with  hesitation  (Zorza,  1992).  It  is important  to recognize  that
law  enforcement  alone,  will  not  solve  the  problem  of  domestic  violence.  The
criminalization  of  other  ces,  such  as homicide,  without  changing  the  core  societal
supports,  has failed  to decrease  ce  rates.  Domestic  violence  is no different.  Merely
criminalizing  the  batterers  and  focusing  community  efforts  solely  on  altering  the  legal
response  to battering,  will  not  change  the social  or  cultural  context  within  which  battering
takes  place  and  will  have  little,  if  any,  sustained  effect  on  the  prevalence  or incidents  of
battering  (Tift,  1993).
Interventions  should  focus  on  implementing  strategies  which  will  have  a direct
impact  on policy  performance.  Given  that  mandatory  arrest  is based  on  the  theoretical
framework  that  legal  sm'ictions  are certain  and  should  occur  swiftly,  it  would  appear  that
due  to the  low  occurrence  of  prosecution  and  conviction,  the  greatest  point  of  intervention
should  focus  on  policies  and  procedures  after  the suspect  is taken  into  custody.  Thus,  the
role  of  prosecution  and  the  judiciary  is critical.  In  order  to ensure  that  legal  sanctions
beyond  the act  of  arrest  do occur,  sentencing  guidelines  for  prosecution  and  the  judiciaty
should  be implemented,  as well  as monitored.  Arrest  without  prosecutonal  and  judicial
guidelines,  as well  as supportive  services  for  victims,  does  not  deter  future  violence
(Welch,  1994).
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Currently,  the  act  of  arrest  facilitates  primarily  law  enforcement  intervention.
Given  the  complex  nature  of  domestic  violence,  over-utilizing  one  intervention,  such as
law  enforcement,  would  be a grave  injustice  to addressing  domestic  violence.  Research
has indicated  that  social  control  is most  effective  when  legal  controls  interact  reciprocally
with  extra  legal  social  controls,  which  suggests  that  the  role  of  legal institutions  may most
effectively  focus  on  the  punishment  of  offenders  and  indirectly  on  the coordination  of
extra  legal  services  to protect  battered  women  (Fagan,  1996).  While  it is imperative  that
legal  institutions  are open  and  accessible  to battered  women,  they  should  not  take  on  the
role  of  managing  and  coordinating  services.  If  the  primary  focus  of  legal  institutions  is on
deterrence  and  punishment,  they  can  focus  their  efforts  on interventions  that  will  allow
them  to maximize  their  efforts  (Fagan,  1996).
Given  the  inconclusive  research  on the deterrent  effects  of  arrest,  taking  a narrow
approach,  such  as focusing  on arrest  and  sanctioning,  does  not  necessarily  ensure  an
increase  in victim  safety.  Therefore,  collaborative  efforts,  such  as coordinated
community  interventions,  may  be the  only  way  to ensure,  as well  as monitor,  that  the
competing  goals  of  victim  safety  and  perpetrator  accountability  are met.  Current  research
indicates  that  police  action,  in  coordination  with  other  criminal  justice  interventions,  is a
significant  deterrent  (Steinman,  1990).  CCI's  may  provide  the  forum  needed  in  order  to
address  existing  gaps  in  the  system  as well  as the opportiu'iity  to monitor  the disposition
of  domestic  violence  cases.  Collaboration  must  occur  and  be coordinated  between  law
enforcement,  social  service  agencies,  mental  health  services  and  the  judiciary  (Sherman,
1992).  CCI's  may  allow  legal  institutions  to maximize  their  efforts  by  managing  and
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coordinating  services  to battered  women.
Further,  collaborative  efforts  may  help  to deal  with  the  weak  social  ties  and
unemployment  that  are associated  with  high  risk  offenders  (Mignon  &  Holmes,  1995).
Integrated  systems  of  interventions  and  support  are more  likely  to succeed  rather  than  an
over-reliance  on  any  single  facet  of  the  system  (Hutchison,  Hirshel  &  Pesakis,  1994).  All
key  players  within  the  system,  working  together,  can  ensure  that  domestic  violence  cases
are not  "swept  under  the  rug"  and  that  consequences  do occur  swiftly.
The  inconclusive  research  on domestic  violence  warrants  the  need  for  further,
more  extensive  studies.  Longitudinal  studies  on domestic  violence  are rare  (Gelles,  1993).
The  absence  of  data  on victims  and  perpetrators  for  prolonged  periods  of  time  has led  to
huge  gaps  in  existing  literature.  Longitudinal  studies  are needed  that  specifically  examine
long-term  arrest  data  to determine  the  effects  of  arrest,  as well  as collecting  victim  data  in
order  to ensure  the  decreases  in  arrest  rates  are not  due  to victim  reluctance  or
unwillingness  to call  law  enforcement.  Studies  are needed  that  explore  and  break  down
perpetrator  subgroups  in  order  to test  the  differing  effects  of  legal  sanctions  on different
offender  subgroups  (Fagan,  1996).  Further,  research  on  the  points  of  implementation,
such  as prosecution  and  adjudication  is limited.  Data  should  utilize  various
measurements,  collected  from  the  point  of  arrest  until  case disposition  and  focus  on the
specific  point  or  points  when  deterrent  effects  do occur  with  arrest.
Finally,  given  the lack  of  a unified  approach  in  the  theoretical  frameworks  utilized
to develop  research  designs,  theories  need  to be integrated  and  expanded  in  order  to
develop  one  unified  theory  explaining  domestic  violence.  Without  a unified  theory
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explaining  domestic  violence,  strategies  and  interventions  tend  to become  fragmented  and
less effective  (Dwyer  et al., 1995).  Knowledge  on  the  limits  of  criminal  sanctions  for
serious  violence,  escalation  of  violence  and its prediction  value  of  victim  risk  and
recidivism  should  be integrated  into  the  research  which  influences  criminal  justice  and
social  policies  on  domestic  violence  (Fagan,  1988).
IMPLICATIONS  FOR  SOCIAL  WORK
Domestic  violence  raises  important  issues  for  social  workers.  The  voluminous
research  firom  diverse  paradigms,  compounded  by  the  absence  of  a commonly  accepted
explanatory  theory  of  domestic  violence,  in  addition  to the  distorting  influence  of  societal
biases,  norms  and  perceptions,  have  lead  to difficulties  in  the interpretation  of  violence.
Further,  these  factors  make  it  difficult  for  practitioners  to establish  a firm  knowledge  base
on  domestic  violence,  which  complicates  assessment  and  intervention  approaches  (Dwyer
et al., 1995).
Nonetheless,  it  is imperative  to integrate  research  and  theoretical  explanations  to
practice  methods.  Therefore,  practitioners  who  adhere  to individual  models  of  violence
would  advocate  approaches  such  as crisis  intervention,  cognitive  therapy,  victim  support,
educational  groups  and  batterers  rehabilitation.  On  the other  hand,  supporters  of
sociological  models  would  advocate  family  system  interventions,  such  as safe  housing
and  counseling  in  shelter  programs.  Finally,  socio-structural  model  supporters  would
strive  to pursue  legislative  and/or  policy  change  in  order  to enhance  the status  of  women
in  society  (Dwyer  et al., 1995).
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The  complexity  of  the  nature  of  domestic  violence  makes  simplistic  solutions
impractical.  Domestic  violence  solutions  must  include  multiple  components  within  a
holistic  framework.  An  ecological  approach  has been  suggested  as the  most  useful  avenue
for  change  effort  in  dealing  with  domestic  violence  for  several  reasons.  First,  it  provides  a
framework  for  multi-level  interventions.  In  addition,  it  also  builds  upon  the  person  in  the
environment  perspective  fundamental  to social  work  practice.  This  approach  incorporates
a systems  approach  to change  and  impacts  at the  micro,  meso  and  macro  levels  (Dwyer  et
al., 1995).  This  approach  also  correlates  with  social  work's  commitment  to individual  and
social  change.
Regardless  of  the  fratnework  utilized,  practitioners  should  understand  that  each
individual  case has its  own  set of  causal  factors.  Utilizing  approaches  that  seem  useful  to
other  clients  and  iSSueS  may  be ineffective  and  could  potentially  place  the  victim  at an
increased  risk  of  danger  (Dwyer  et al., 1995).  In  developing  a definition  of  the  problem,
cultural  and  societal  implications  must  be considered.  The  definition  will  become  central
to change  efforts  and  interventions  should  flow  from  the  statement  of  concern.
Practitioners  must  raise  their  own  consciousness  about  the different  forms  of
abuse  and  assume  the  responsibility  for  leaming  about  the climate  of  control  that  exists
within  violent  relationships  (Golden  &  Frank,  1994).
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AN  ACT  to eeate  939.62  ] and  968.075  of  the  statutes,  relating  to arrest,  domestic  abuse  and  providing  penalties.
TliepeopleoffJieslateof  Wisconsin,representedinsen-
ate and assembisi, do enact as follows:
SECTION  1.  Legislative  intent  and purpose.  (l)
The  legislature  finds  that  societal  attitudes  have  been
reflected  in policies  and  practices  of  law  enforcement
agencies,  prosecutors  and  courts.  Under  these  policies
and practices,  the treatment  or  a crime  may  vary
widely  depending  on  the relationship  between  the
criminal  offender  and  the  victim  of  the  crime.  Only
recently  has public  perception  of  the serious  conse-
quences  of  domestic  violence  to  society  and  to individ-
ual victims  led to the recognition  or  the  necessity  for
early  intervention  by the  criminal  justice  system.
(2) The  legislature  intends,  by passage  of  this  act,
that:
(a) The  official  response  to cases  of  domestic  vio-
lence  stress  the enforcement  of  the laws,  protect  the
victim  and communicate  the attitude  that  violent
behavior  is neither  excused  nor  tolerated.
(b) Criminal  laws  be enforced  without  regard  to the
relationship  of  the  persons  involved.
(c)  District  attorneys  document  the  extent  of
domestic  violence  incidents  requiring  the  intervention
of  law  enforcement  agencies.
(d)  Law  enforcement  agencies  be encouraged  to
provide  adequate  training  to officers  handling  domes-
tic  violence  incidents.
(3) The  purpose  of  this  act  is to  recognize  domestic
violence  as involving  serious  crimina)  offenses  and  to
provide  increased  protection  for  the  victims  of  domes-
tic  violence.
SECTION  2.  939.62)  or  the statutes  is created  to
read:
939.621  Increased  penalty  for  certain  domestic  abuse
offenses.  lr a person  commits  an act of  domestic
abuse,  as defined  in  s. 968.075  (l)  (a)  and  the  act  con-
stitutes  the  commission  of  a crime,  the  maximum  term
or imprisonment  for  that  crime  may  be increased  by
not  more  than  2 years  if  the  crime  is committed  during
the 24 hours  immediately  following  an arrest  for a
domestic  abuse  incident,  as set I-orth  in s. 968.075  5).
The  24-hour  period  applies  whether  or  not  there  has
been a waiver  by the  victim  under  s. 968.075  (5) (c).
The  victim  of  the  domestic  abuse  crime  does  not  have
to be the  same  as the  victim  of  the  domestic  abuse  inci-
dent  that  resulted  in the  arrest.  The  penalty  increase
under  this  section  changes  the status  of  a misde-
meanor  to a felony.
SECTION  3. 968.075  or  the  statutes  is created  to
read:
968.075  Domestic  abuse  incidents;  arrest  and  prose-
cution.  (l)  DEFINITIONS.  In  this  section:
(a)  "Domestic  abuse"  means  any  of  the  following
engaged  in by an adult  person  against  his or her
spouse,  former  spouse  or  adult  relative  or  against  an
adult  with  whom  the  person  resides  or  formerly
resided:
1. Intentional  infliction  of  physical  pain,  physical
injury  or  illness.
2. Tntentional  impairment  of  physical  condition.
3. A violation  of  s. 940.225  (l),  (2)  or  (3).
4. A physical  act,  or  a threat  in conjunction  with  a
physical  act,  which  may  cause  the  other  person  rea-
sonably  to rear imminent  engagement  in the  conduct
described  under  subd.  1, 2 or  3.
(b)  "Law  enforcement  agency"  has the meaning
specified  in s. 165.83  (1)  (b).
(c)  "Relative"  means  a parent,  grandparent,  step-
parent,  brother,  sister,  first  cousin,  nephew,  niece,
uncle,  aunt,  stepbrother,  stepsister,  child,  stepchild,
father-in-law,  mother-in-law,  daughter-in-law  or  son-
in-law.
(2)  MANDATORY  ARREST.  Notwithstanding  s.
968.07,  a law  enforcement  officer  shall  arrest  and  take
a person  into  custody  if:
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(a)  The  ul'iiccr  liiih  rc,isonalilc  gi'otiiitJi  lt'i believe
that  tlic  pci'son  IS cciminillii'ig  cir  h.is  comtnitlcd
domestic  abuse  aml  tliai  the pcrhc'in'h  ;ictions  consti-
tute  the  coinmissicin  of'  a crime;  and
(b)  Either  or both  ola lhe taollowing circuinstanccs
arc  present:
1. The  off'icer  has a reasonable  basis  laor believing
that  there  is a possibility  olacominued  violence  against
the  alleged  victim.
2. There  is evidence  of" physical  injury  to the  alleged
VICtlm.
(3)  LAW  ENFORCEMENT POLICIES.  (a)  Each  1aw
enforcement  agency  shall  develc'ip,  adopt  and  imple-
ment  written  policies  regarding  arrest  procedures  For
domestic  abuse  incidents.  The  policies  slia)l  include,
but  not  be limited  to,  the  following:
1. Statements  emphasizing  that:
a.  in  most  circumstances,  other  than  those  under
sub.  (2),  a law  enrorcement  officer  should  arrest  and
take  a person  into  custody  if  the  officer  has  reasonable
grounds  to believe  that  the person/is  committing  or
has  committed  domestic  abuse  and  that  the  person's
actions  constitute  the  commissi*in  of  a crime.
b. When  the officer  has re;isonable  grounds  lo
believe  that  spouses,  Former  spouscs  or  other  persons
who  reside  together  or formerly  resided  together  are
committing  or  have  committed  domestic  abuse
against  each  other,  the  orlicer  ciocs  not  have  to arrest
both  persons,  but  should  arrchl  :lie  person  wliom  lhe
officer  believes  to be the primary  physical  aggrcssor.
In determining  who  is the  primary  physical  aggressor,
an orficer  should  consider  thc  intenl  ola this  section  to
protect  victims  or domestic  violence,  the  relative
degree  or injury  or  rear inflicted  on  the  persons
involved  and  any  history  of  domestic  abuse  between
these  persons,  if  that  history  can  reasonably  be ascer-
tained  by the  officer.
c. A  law enforcement  officer  s decision  as to
whether  or  not  to arrest  under  this  section  may  not  be
based  on the  consem  or  the  victim  to any  subsequent
prosecution  or on the relationship  of  the persons
involved  in the  incident.
d. A law  enforcement  officer's  dccision  not  to  arrcst
under  this  section  may  not  be based  solely  upon  the
absence  of  visible  indications  ofinjury  or  impairment.
2. A procedure  for  the written  report  and reJirra)
required  under  sub.  (4),
3. A procedure  for  notirying  the  alleged  victit'n  or
the  incident  of  the  prcivisioris  in sub.  (5).
(b)  In the  devc!opment  or these  policies,  each  :aw
enforcement  agency  is encouraged  to consult  with
pommuniiy  organizations  and  other  law  enforcement
agencies  with  expertise  in the recognition  and han-
dling  or domestic  abuse  incidents.
(c) This  subsection  does  not  limit  the  authority  of  a
law  enforcement  agency  o establish  policies  ha
require  arrests  under  more  circumstances  than  those
set forth  in sub.  (2).
(4)  Rtptm'r  aiiuiut:n  WHERE NO ARREST.  )f  a law
enforcement  officer  does  not  make  an arrest  under
this  seclion  when  the ofTicer  has reasonable  grounds
lo believe  that  a person  is committing  or  has  commit-
ted domestic  abuse  and  that  person's  acts  constitute
the  commission  or  a crime,  the  ofncer  shall  prepare  a
written  report  stating  why  the  person  was  not
arrested.  The  report  shall  be sent  to the  district  attor-
ney's  omce, in the  coumy  where  the  acts  took  place,
immediately  after  investigation  or the incident  has
been  completed.  The  district  attorney  shall  review  the
report  to  determine  whether  the  person  involved  in the
incident  should  be charged  with  the  commission  of  a
crime.
(5) CONTACT  pgohini'riox.  (a) 1. Unless  there  is a
waiver  under  par.  (c),  during  the  24 hours  immediately
following  an arrest  for  a domestic  abuse  incident,  the
arrested  person  shall  avoid  the  residence  or the  alleged
victim  of  the  domestic  abuse  incident  and,  if  applica-
ble,  any  premises  temporarily  occupied  by the  alleged
victim,  and  avoid  contacting  or  causing  any  person.
other  than  attorneys  for  the arrested  person  and
alleged  victim,  to contact  the  alleged  victim.
2. An  ;irrestcd  person  who  intentionally  violates
this  paragraph  shall  be required  to forlaeit not  more
than  $1,000.
(b)  1. Un)ess  there  is a waiver  under  par.  (c),  a law
enforcement  oriicer  or other  person  who  releases  a
person  arrested  f'cir a doinestic  abuse  incident  from
custody  less ihan  24 hours  after  the  ;irrest  shall  inform
the  arrested  person  orally  and  in  writing  of' the
requiren'ienLs  under  par.  (a),  the  consequences  of  vio-
lating  the  requiremems  and  the  provisions  of s.
939.621.  The  arrested  person  shail  sign  an acknowl-
edgemcnt  on  the written  notice  that  he or she has
received  notice  or,  and  understands  the  requirements,
the consequences  ola violating  the requirements  and
the provisions  of  s. 939.621.  If  the arrested  person
refuses  to sign  the  notice,  he or she may not be
released  from  custody.
2. IF there  is a waiver  under  par.  (c) and  the  person
is released  under  subd.  1. the  law  enforcement  ofncer
or  other  person  who  releases  the  arrested  person  shall
inform  the  arrested  person  orally  and  in writing  of  the
waivcr  and  the provisions  of  s. 939.6:1.
3. Failure  to comply  with  the notice  requirement
under  subd.  1 regarding  a person  who  is lawlaully
released  from  custody  bars  a prosecution  under  par.
(a),  but  does  not  alTect  tlie  application  of  s. 939.621  in
any  criminal  prosecution.
(c) At  any  time  during  the  24-hour  period  specified
in par.  (a),  the  alleged  victim  may  sign  a written  waiver
of  the  requiremems  in par.  (a). The  law  enforcement
agency  shall  have  ;i waiver  form  available.
(d) The  law  enf'orcement  agency  responsible  ('or the
arrest  or  a person  I-or a domestic  abuse  incident  shall
notilay  the alleged  victim  of  the requirements  under
%ffl/
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par.  (a)  and  the  possibility  o(a. pro(cclurc  l'ty  and  dTcct
ola :ti u;iiver  under  par.  (c).
(c)  Nolwillislanding  S. 9(iS.ll7,  a laii'  cnlaorccment
omcer  shall  ari'est  and take  a pcrscin  1111(1 cusiiiciy  ir'
the  ol-licer  hits reasonable  grounds  to bclicyc  th;it  tlic
person  has violated  par.  (a).
(6)  CoNDl'llONAl  uiiibhsi;.  A person  ;irrcstctJ  and
taken  into  custcidy  For a domestic  abuse  incidcnt  is cli-
gible  loor conditional  release.  Unless  there  is a waiver
under  sub.  (5) (cl,  as part  ollhe  condilicins  oJaany such
reiease  that  occurs  during  tlie  24 hours  immediately
Following  such  an arrest.  the  person  shall  be required
to  comply  with  the  requirements  under  sub.  (5)  (a)  and
to sign  the  acknowledgement  under  sub.  (5)  (b).  The
arrested  person's  release  shall  be conditioned  upon  his
or  her  signed  agreement  to refrain  From  any  threats  or
acts  or domestic  abuse  against  the alleged  victim  or
other  person.  The  person  is not  eligible  ror  re)ease  on
his or her own  recognizance  pursuant  to a citation
issued  under  s. 800.02  or  968.085.
(7) %'isccuriorg  poucu':s.  Each  district  attorney  s
orfice  shall  develop,  adopt  and  implement  written  pol-
icies  encouraging  the prosecution  of  domestic  abuse
offenses.  The  policies  shall  inc)udc,  but  not  be limited
to,  the  laollowing:
(a) A policy  indicating  that  a prosecutor's  decision
not  to prosecute  a domestic  abuse  incident  should  not
be based:
I. Solely  upon  the  absencc  or  visible  indications  ol-
injury  Or impairment;
2. Upon  the victim's  consent  to any  subsequent
prosecution  or he other  person  involved  in the inci-
dent;  or
3. Upon  the  relationship  of  the  persons  involved  in
the  incident.
(b)  A policy  indicating  that  when  any  domestic
abuse  incident  is reported  to the district  attorney's
ori'icc,  including  a rcpori  m;ide  under  sub.  (4).  a cliarg-
ing decisi*m  hy the district  atiorney  should.  absent
e'<tr:iordin;ir>  circuinstanceh.  be inade not later tlian 2
yicckh  al'icr  the  district  amirney  has  receiied  ncnice ol"
ilic  incitleni.
(b)  El)l:(.4111)N  ANI)  'i'tthixixc.  Any  education  and
training  by the  law  cnl'orcemcnt  agency  rclaling  lo  the
h;indling  or  dc'imeslic  abuse  complaints  shall  stress
cnlaorccmenl  or  crimina)  )aws  in domestic  abuse  inci-
dents  and protection  or the alleged  victim.  Law
enrorceinent  agencies  and  community  organizations
witl'i  expertise  in  the  recognition  and handling  ola
domestic  ;ihuse  incidents  shall  cooperate  in all  aSpeCtS
ola the  training.
(9)  ANNUAL  REPOR'r.  (a)  Each  district  attorney
shall  submit  an annual  report  to the department  or
justice  listing  all of  the  following:
1. T)ic  number  or  arrests  ror  domestic  abuse  inci-
dents  in his or  her  county  as compiled  and  furnished
by the  law  enforcement  agencies  within  the  county.
2. The  number  ol- subsequent  prosecutions  and
convictions  or  the  persons  arrested  For domestic  abuse
incidents.
(b)  The  )isting  of  the  number  of  arrests,  prosecu-
tions  and  convictions  under  par.  (a)  shall  include  cafe-
gorics  by statutory  rererence  to the  ofai-ense involved
and  include  totals  for  all  categories.
SECTION  4.  Nonstatutory  provisions.  Each  law
enforcement  agency  and  each  district  attorney's  or'hce
shall  develop  written  policies  under  section  968.075  (3)
and  (7) or the  statutes,  as created  by this  act,  so that
the policies  are in effect  on  or  before  Apri)  1, 1989.
SECTION  5. Effective  dates.  This  act  takes  effect
on April  1, 1989,  except  as follows:
(l)  Thecreationorsection968.075(3)and(7)orthe
statutes  and  SECT}ON 4 or  this  act  take  effect  on the
day  after  publication.
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